Chapter 8, 9, Epilogue

The U.S. owes Taiwan its support, protection, and loyalty. I would also argue we owe Taiwan an apology for our cavalier treatment of a long time friend. Since 1971 the U.S. has been part of a global competition to win the economic favors of China. By 1979 the U.S. had terminated treaties with and publicly humiliated Taiwan by formally recognizing China. Thankfully the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) which provided “continued relations.” Shelley Rigger likened the TRA to the last fairy’s wish that lightened the curse in Sleeping Beauty. Though there was no formal U.S. embassy anymore the act provided for the establishment of the American Institute. Equally important and more substantive was the clause providing defensive weapons to Taiwan. The U.S. has pursued a policy of strategic ambiguity in cross straight relations. This keeps both Taiwan and China unsure about U.S. response to actions or provocations by either nation.
The U.S. is responsible for Taiwan’s current predicament as well as its continued success. The U.S. supported the nationalists in 1945 and elevated Taiwan as a champion of freedom in the face communist expansion during the cold war, making it a target for China. Pressure from the U.S. accelerated Taiwan’s trajectory to full democracy which fostered Taiwanese identity and all the accomplishments to date. Modern weapons and strategic ambiguity by the U.S. continues to prevent a violent invasion of Taiwan.

I can honestly say I have an answer for why Taiwan matters. It matters to me. It matters to every one of us on the study tour, and it certainly matters to the people of Taiwan. It matters that a vibrant, productive, creative nation has the right to pursue its own destiny. I can’t agree with the inevitability of Taiwan’s unification with China. There is everything to lose and nothing to be gained. If Taiwan continues to bide its time, mind its tongue, cultivate its friends, stand as a beacon of democracy, and make itself indispensable to the world, Taiwan wins.

Strategic ambiguity doesn't surprise me when it comes to US foreign policy. The US has both goals and morals aligned with those of Taiwan. The fact that the US would revoke its recognition of Taiwan in favor of China, for economic benefit, is in line with what the US has done quite often in the past. If the US recognized Taiwan, one of our largest trade partners would most likely drop us. The US could easily recognize Taiwan and by example, other countries could recognize its legitimacy as well. I can't help but feel that until the capitalist world looks past profit and towards human rights, values and fair practice, countries like the ROC will remain powerless until tensions with China are resolved.

“To help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific and to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, Taiwan Relations Act” " target="_blank" rel="nofollow">http://china.usc.edu/taiwan-relations-act-1979

The relationship between the United States and Taiwan is an unofficial relationship. The boundaries of this “relationship” are not clear. Are they allies? Are they cordial? Are they…? It is not understandable. For the US, is better to maintain this ambiguity in order to prevent negative relationships. In 1979, the United States-People’s Republic of China Joint Communique changed diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing and recognized the government of the P. R. C. as the only legal government of China. Taiwan was left “out to dry”. While the U.S will continue to have unofficial relations, they will not support its independence. By maintaining strong unofficial relations, the U.S is maintaining a sense of peace. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act provides the details for this unofficial relationship. One of the things that the US committed to was maintaining its defensive capability. Not necessarily defending them. Confusing, I know. According to Rigger, “It should be clear by now that America’s Taiwan policy is subtle and complex, and that is no accident…The policy is ambiguous in the sense that neither Taipei nor Beijing can be entirely certain how the United States will respond to actions they might take.” (p.182) That’s "great" for the United States, but not the other countries involved. The US needs to be clear with their stance.

This reminds me of two scenarios:
1) A classroom with ambiguous rules and expectations- a student can claim that he/she didn’t know what was expected of him/her and constantly be disruptive.
2) A relationship- “Are we exclusive? Or hanging out?” Officially unofficial does not work in either scenario.
edited by malvarenga on 8/3/2015

The US and other nations continue to stay away from publicly backing China or Taiwan in this decades old conflict. Although some leaders in these nations may want to governments or militaries to intervene and force the issue, others encourage a hands-off approach. In 2002, Tucker wrote that the US should continue to respect Taiwan’s choices and encourage a peaceful path towards a mutually acceptable unification deal (P.194). While the political course of action seems to be inaction, the people we met in China and Taiwan were not so reticent.

From our visit to Baidu, we found that Chinese citizens are using mobile technologies to connect to local and global communities. From our visit to the Taiwanese production company, we learned that Taiwanese and Chinese viewers watched provocative shows that used comedy, satire and drama to challenge political and social differences. With masses of people consuming, sharing and discussing more political and social topics, the juxtaposition of these dialogues will help to shape new perspectives within both nations. By consuming and embracing these forms of communication, I believe a culture of awareness and action is developing in China as well as Taiwan.

Taiwan has shown that it is capable of establishing a democratic government. As Fonte stated, Taiwan has successfully transformed itself from “an authoritarian state to a real democracy” (P.190). If Taiwan can transform itself, it begs the question if mainland China can do the same thing. After meeting and talking with people from both places, I am hopeful for social and political change. While these changes may not happen over night, small allowances like easing of restricted search terms online or airing another controversial Taiwanese talk show may be signs of progress. I am also hopeful that the growing social, cultural and digital interactions will encourage China’s leaders to look more closely at their system of governance to make changes that benefit the people. If that happens, I think then China and Taiwan would be in a much better position to begin to resolve their political problems.

Visiting Taiwan was such a great experience that it is hard to accept anything less than full recognition and support as what the nation is due from the world, never mind the US. Taiwan has all the characteristics of the kind of country one would want to see included in such international organizations as the United Nations, and yet because the PRC is such a big player in world affairs, Taiwan looks stuck in this isolated position indefinitely. Although the US tactic of strategic ambiguity lacks the moral high ground that we tend to value in American intervention in foreign affairs, we seem to be as stuck in that role as Taiwan is in its isolation. Until China's position on Taiwan evolves, the world's support must continue to flow towards Taiwan through soft rather than "hard" diplomacy.
Taiwan is a great subject for teaching the history of the Cold War and the sometimes unintended consequences of American foreign policy decisions. Nixon and Kissinger seized unprecedented levels of control and secrecy in the period leading up to the great state visit of 1972, which represented a serious about-face for Nixon, who had built his reputation as an active anti-Communist. Nixon's conversion from that position to his DeGaulle-influenced adoption of the idea of detente and a more European style balance of powers approach in dealing with Russia and China has had massive unintended consequences for Taiwan in particular. It would be interesting to learn more from Taiwanese sources about the years between Nixon's visit in 1972 and full normalization of relations between the US and the PRC under Carter in 1979. What did the Taiwanese think about what was happening between the US and China? How much did they feel it as a direct attack on their original relationship with the US?
Ultimately it looks as though economics and the disposition of the South China Sea will continue to be the primary factors determining how the PRC handles Taiwan. We saw at the maritime museum how massively well prepared Taiwan is to go on playing a major role in shipping in the Pacific. The PRC must envy the success of a company like Evergreen, which first prospered in the 1970s--at the same time that Taiwan was losing its hold on official diplomatic relations. As Rigger shows with the Want Want example, multinational corporations are as much players in this political negotiation as the states themselves.