Home Forums Short Online Seminars Two Koreas, Summer 2020 Session 2 (July 13) - 1994-2011: Kim Jong Il

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  • #7882
    cgao
    Spectator

    How did Kim Jong Il ensure regime survival? How did South Korea’s Sunshine Policy change international relations?

    Video: The Two Koreas in the Kim Jong Il era (1994-2011): Nuclearization and the Sunshine Policy

     

     

    Readings (download below):

    • International Atomic Energy Agency, “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1970/infcirc140.pdf.
    • Ilpyong J. Kim, “Kim Jong Il’s Military-First Politics,” in North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival, ed. Young Whan Kihl and Hong Nack Kim (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), 59-74.
    • Andrei Lankov, The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia, rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 77-110.
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    #43513
    Tom Mueller
    Spectator

    I believe Kim Jong II had a two prong approach. First, Kim used the Son gun Policy of military first.  As he moved through his leadership training, he held on to power of the military.  He also consolidated his power through leadership roles in different institutions.  He then made sure that he was addressed as the National Defense Commission Chairman and not the Korean Workers Party.  This rose the military stature and put it front and center.  This move was also solidified in the new constitution including the deletion of the communism.  Kim pushed this move to weed out corruption and to bring that “passion” back into his administration.   This was not only about building up its own defenses, but also manufacturing weapons for export. He sent missiles to Yemen, Vietnam, UAE, Pakistan, Syria, Libya, Iran, Egypt, and of course Iraq.  The Scud missiles used in the first Gulf War were exported to Iraq from North Korea.  Then Kim pushed to build a nuclear arsenal.  I wonder if Kim felt that nuclear weapons would level the playing field between themselves and military strength of the US, South Korea, etc.  I remember reading one article on Pakistan and one of the Pakistani leaders stated they are building their nuclear arsenal to offset India’s military – not only personnel, but also conventional weapons and capital.  Of course North Korea then did not want to sign the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty.  This treaty stated that those with nuclear weapons would work on disarmament talks and share their “peaceful” nuclear technology with those that did not have the technology (as long as they did not try to acquire nuclear war technology).  This treaty sounds good in practice, however it is not that simple when it comes to nuclear weapons and its technology Countries examine those with Nuclear Weapons (The Nuclear 5) and they also have a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.  As we all know this is a very powerful position.  Also nuclear weapons can be used to build domestic cohesion.  A country has nuclear weapons, then Nuclear 5 also needs to pay attention to this country or at least keep them on their radar.  Another use of nuclear weapon technology is it shows these countries are not “technologically backward”, you need a lot of intelligent people to create nuclear energy and then transfer it to warhead. 

    Also North Korea worked with South Korea via the Sunshine Policy.  As I read in one article, there were real economic problems that may have pushed North Korea into working with capitalist countries (flooding, famine, etc.) This brought trade and the building of Kaesong Industrial Complex.  This sounded like international companies first starting in China’s Special Economic Zones.  The companies are able to use the cheaper labor and keep their products’ cost low so they compete in the global market. The North Koreans received jobs.  In the video, you discussed the wages in 2012 were $180.  Was that above, average or below labor costs in the rest of North Korea?  This policy of engagement was to bring the two Koreas together.  However the costs of the Sunshine Policy were not as impactful.  I wonder if South Korea had similar thinking to the US (via Chinese trade, etc.).  If we can help build them economically (and get a little something for our businesses), then they (North Korea or China) will be more open politically.  However that did not happen in China and it did not happen in North Korea

    #43515
    Julie Wakefield
    Spectator

    There were many changes that Kim Jong Il put in place to ensure the survival of the regime after the passing of his father. He put the military above the party in an attempt to 'safegauard our own socialism under any circumstances' and allowed it to be run by the ruling elite - those of which he appointed. Many of these were previous leaders but there were also many new, younger leaders involved to help the new ideology emerge and stay strong. He felt that by increasing the influence and purpose of the military he would be able to stablize the country in the face of the collpase of the Soviet Union and the pending economic crisis. Additionally, he did not trust the old guard in the Korean Workers' Party who he felt were not innovative nor encapsulated any new ideas for moving the nation forward. Kim Jong Il introduced a new slogan - Strong and Prosperous Great State - to give the people hope that the nation of the leader they loved still would be held together and would move foraward successfully under new leadership. This slogan was also for the world to take note that the death of one leader did not mean the death of the nation. The nation would move forward stronger than before. In this, there were sweeping market reforms (both market economy and literal markets) to provide more successful internal economic growth. Additionally, there were international diplomatic relations established. The establishment of these relations was to show the world they were willing to create trade relations and participate in the world economy but on their terms.

    The intention of the Sunshine Policy was to address the growing economic gap between the north and the south and restoring lost communication between the two nations. The policy established regular contact between the two nations to discuss joint business ventures and plan some family reunifications. By increasing communications and providing outlets for economic growth the hope that there would not be any aggressive military actions towards the south. The North declared they wanted to make sure they were not 'taken over' by the south. Other countries with diplomatic relations with South Korea expressed concern over South Korea's 'friending' of North Korea. They were fearful that South Korea would favor North Korea on the internation level and work towards their own interests with North Korea. The policy lapsed for some years which appears to be connected to the nuclear advancements of North Korea. After some time, the policy reemerged and the world saw the two countries emerge in joint sport activities, more diplomatic North Koreans in attendance at international events and more meetings between North Korea and other countries. 

     

    #43517
    Meghann Seril
    Spectator

    I found it interesting that Kim Jong Il felt the need to start from scratch so to speak when establishing his regime. He opted to align with the military leaders and promote younger members to higher positions. I would think that with Kim Il Sung's blessing that he should be the successor that Kim Jong Il would not have felt threatened by the older generation of leadership and might rely on them for a smooth transition. I would also wonder about the perception that the members of the older leadership regime would not be able to shift their allegiance to Kim Jong Il. Was that a reasonable concern? I am also wondering if Kim Jong Il's "on the spot inspections" were akin to Kim Il Sung's "on the spot guidance?" If so, this strategy would be a good way for Kim Jong Il to ingratiate himself to the military members who were the majority of his base in establishing his regime.

    #43518
    Alyssa Yff
    Spectator

    How did Kim Jong Il ensure regime survival? How did South Korea’s Sunshine Policy change international relations?

    I thought the articles on Kim Jong Il's regime were very interesting.  Like what Tom stated above, much of Kim Jong Il's rise to power was centered around strategic moves by Kim Il Sung.  Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, Kim Jong Il was positioned for succession through various positions with in the KWP central committee and the National Defense Commission.  During the 1980s, Kim Il Sung made a speech stating that the issue of succession was resolved - basically claiming the ascension of Kim Jong Il (Kim, 63).  Likewise, Kim Jong Il was strategic in his rise to power as he shifted the focus of politics from KWP centered to military centered.  The 1998 Constiution laid the groundwork for allowing Kim Jong Il to become "eternal president" and shift power away from the party to the military.  The Kim article stated that through this process, he became the supreme commander of the state, party and society.  As Kim came into power in the late 90s, he implemented political changes to give the military increased power, replaced the military leadership, and he also put out propaganda to build the military as the tool to "safeguard socialism" (Kim, 63).  In doing so, he put the military as the body to solve the nation's problems.  What I found very interesting is how the argument for a militarized state was phrased as a way to confront imperialists.  This was presented as the best way to fight off imperialist threats like the United States and protect North Korea, the "Fatherland."  Additionally, to ensure regime survival Kim Jong Il filled the leadership positions with in the North Korean state with people he thought were patriotic and dedicated (Kim, 67).  He felt that the old KWP leadership had become corrupt and lost their ability to appeal to the masses.  Therefore, a new strategy was necessary for him to ensure regime survival.  The strategy would be a strong ideology, strong economics, and strong military.

    As mentioned by Julia and Tom above, the Sunshine policy was part of a series of economic reforms implemented by Kim Jong Il in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  Korea had faced declining success economically and had suffered hardships of famine, drought, etc during the 1990s.  As Kim Jong Il came to power he pushed through a variety of economic reforms that were introducing a market based economy and more international cooperation.  The Sunshine policy allowed for greater cooperation between the two Korean states, while the economic reforms were similar to China's policies under Mao focusing on agriculutural productivity through collectivization.  Kim Jong Il focused on agricultural reforms initially with the farmers and then pursued industrial activities through the Kaesong Industrial Complex. 

    A few questions I have:

    1) In the lecture, the Sunshine policy between North and South Korea seemed to have a rocky relationship and then ended.  Was there any positive impact in either North or South Korea economically? 

    2) Did Kim Jong Il or Kim Jong Un end this policy?  Where do the states stand at this point - how much cooperation occurs? 

    3) When Kim Jong Il passed away, was succession assumed at this point due to the previous passing of his father?  Or did Kim Jong Un have to pursue a long ascension to power as well? 

    4) From the Lankov article, Kim Jong Il really reshaped Korean politically, economically and socially.  How successful were his reforms?  What challenges have resulted from these changes to North Korea?

    #43519
    Alyssa Yff
    Spectator

    I am curious about the intentions of South Korea as well.  I think you are right that there were hopes to help build them economically in the hopes of more political cooperation and openness.  It is interesting that it has not worked.  I am curious how these policies have changed with Kim Jong Un - he seems much more hostile to foreigners and the "imperialist" foes.  

    #43520
    Alyssa Yff
    Spectator

    I think you make a very good point Meghan that Kim Jong Il may have assumed that there would be factional disputes and challenges to his rise to power if he kept the existing KWP system.  In the one reading they talked about Kim Il Sung's brother as a rival who had to be put down by the party so that Kim Jong Il could rise to power.  

    In terms of the "on the spot guidance" I wasn't sure if it was tied to the agricultural reforms (collectivization and quotas) or if they were in a different sense. It seems like he used them as a way to bolster his support and image as the heir to the great leader Kim Il Sung.  I thought maybe he was using these just to give himself a reputation boost and rally the people behind him.  This would be a good question to ask tomorrow? 

    #43521
    Tom Mueller
    Spectator

    Julie - very good points.  After reading your discussion about not trusting the old guard.  I wonder how this impacted the "foreign policy thinking" within the Kim Jong II's government.  I remember reading that analysts were worred that his son Kim Jong Un was removing older analysts with younger ones.  One of the points they made was that those older analysts had direct knowledge of the Korean War.  They fought in it and remembered the destruction.  If you take that knowledge away, does it make conflict more likely especially when you might only have a "Hollywood like" understanding of war. 

    #43522
    Jane Hannon
    Spectator

    Winning the support of the military was a major strategy that Kim Jong Il employed to ensure regime survial. From courting the support of the military through small details such as the gifts of watches and emphasizing the use of his military title to essentially placing the military above the Korean Workers Party, Kim Jong Il worked hard to retain the support of the military. 

    I wonder to what extent this is still the strategy of Kim Jon Un? Based on what we learned about the experience of the North Korean soldier who defected in frustration over his treatment--and a recent article I saw suggesting that North Korean soldiers have been directed to provide more food for themselves--I  wonder if the support of the military is still as highly prized today.

    #43523
    Tom Mueller
    Spectator

    Alyssa - great point on the Imperalist vs Fatherland argument.  It is all about controlling the narrative to unite your country.  We have done it in this country.  Obviously China is imperalistic but since they are helping North Korea they are not put in the same light.  I guess my question and I know we would never know the answer, but has there been a concerted effort by the CIA to overthrow the regime since the 1960s?  The US had done it before (Iran in 1953, etc.).  However during the Cold War with the Soviets having such a connection with North Korea - did we feel it was an option on the table?  Then when the USSR fell, did we feel it was worth the risk (especially with China's connection) during this time.  However with the growth of nuclear warheads, did that change the thinking inside the CIA, etc. ?

    #43524
    Tom Mueller
    Spectator

    Jane - Great point.  During Kim Jong II's time it was a push for the military.  So not only were resources focused on the nuclear weapons, but also conventional military weapons, soldiers, etc.  One of the problems with focusing so much of your capital on building nuclear weapons is that it cant be used in other areas of your government and there is no indirect benefits (for example - creating new or improved infrastrucutre, education funding, tech funding, etc.)  However I think Kim Jong Un has pushed a policy called byungjin - focus on nuclear weapons and the economy.  Does this push still mean the whole military complex economy receives funding or just the nuclear program, while the rest goes to other non military economies (and how will that play out with his soldiers)?

    #43527
    Jane Hannon
    Spectator

    It seems that South Korea's Sunshine Policy temporarily had the effect of enabling South Korea to bring North Korea to the table of major world nations to work toward improved relations--as evidenced by the visit of Madeleine Albright and the almost-visit of Bill Clinton--as well as to receive humanitarian assitance from the U.S. and other countries and to work toward nuclear non-proliferation on the Korean Peninsula. This policy enabled  economic cooperation between the North and the South in the form of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, but this doesn't seem to have established lasting trust between the North and the South since concerns remained about whether North Korean workers were actually receiving the wages they were supposed to be paid. It enabled the Six Party Talks to occur, although this does not seem to have resulted in lasting progress. 

    I guess one question I have is whether there was any kind of long-lasting positive legacy from South Korea's Sunshine Policy. It was presumably abandoned because those in power in South Korea thought the costs outweighed the benefit, but was this perception widespread among the South Korean people?

    #43528
    Jasmine Weeks
    Spectator

    How did Kim Jong Il ensure regime survival?

    It’s obvious that Kim Ii Sung had paved the way for Kim Jong II to succeed him as the supreme leader of North Korea through a series of quick promotions from a cadre in the Korea Workers' Party (KWP) after his graduation from the University in 1964,  to establish him to be the future successor 10 years later,  and finally officialized in 1980. The following years starting  in 1981, Kim Jong II began his "practical leadership training" by accompanying his father in overseeing various economical and industrial development and provided leadership for domestic and foreign affairs (IIpiong J. KIm, 60).  The junior Kim however, did not embrace Juche ideology as his father did.  He argued that the old regime, mostly populated the Korea Workers’ Party by old cadres from his father’s time, lacked “dynamism” to move forward to maintain socialist politics.  Seeing the downfall of communism in Russia and Eartern Europe, and the economic crisis within North Korea (NK) around the turn of his taking over the reign, Kim Jong II made policy changes to bring urgent social and economic reform soon after his father’s death in 1994.  A major reconstruction of the constitution in 1998 placed the National Defense Committee (NDC) above the KWP.  As a result, Kim Jong Il as the chairman of the NDC now has the full power to control the economic, political, and military affairs.   Kim Jong II justified his “military first” political movement as his strategy to practice “self-reliant” ideology in Juche by revitalizing economic production to provide the much needed sustenance, and strengthening the military power to protect themselves from the South Korea- U.S. rivals.

    How did South Korea’s Sunshine Policy change international relations?

    The Sunshine Policy (1998-2008) in South Korea during Kim Dae Jung presidency was erected mainly to engage North Korea for repatriation relationally and economically.  The idea started in 1997 with the start of democratization through which Kim wanted to mitigate the economic difference between the two Koreas, and to restore the communications between them.  As a result, Kim Dae Jung won a Nobel peace prize in 2000 for his success in organizing the first North-South Summit.  His successor Roh Moo Hyun continued this reconciliation vision by launching the second North-South summit in 2007.  However, Lee Mying Bak who succeeded Roh as the next president was more interested in revitalizing economic growth within South Korea than promoting the inter-Koreas relationship.  Lee signed a free trade agreement with the EU (2011) and U.S. (2012) and achieved milestones in economic growth. In doing so, Lee had to maintain the U.S.- South Korea partnership and regarded North Korea as a “shared foe” due to the hostile relationship between the U.S. and North Korea.  Moreover according to Tim Shorrock, U.S. foreign policy has historically propagated North Korea as dangerous “rogue states” that necessitated tough policies (US Policy And Korea: A Korea Policy Institute Reader, 45). While South Korea’s stance on the reconciling the two Koreas effort is paramount, the U.S. hostile attitude  towards North Korea needs to be lifted to allow the two Koreas to work things out.

    #43529
    Jasmine Weeks
    Spectator

    Hi Julie, I agree with your point about Kim Jong II introduced new idea and new slogan with his new leadership may not receive overwhelming support from the old guard who fought the war with his father's generation. He mush think that he need to do things in the 'new way" and the 'new poeple' to get the same power and honor.  A change of cabinet with the change of leadership is common in other political system too.  I feel like with the overhelming support South Korea received from the U.S., and the sanction pressed on them, North Korea must think that they must possess something, scuh as the powerful nuclear power, as a defensive mechanism to hold off the superpowers from taking over.  On the other note, I wonder if North Korea were to open up and have a more diplomatic relation with the U.S., would the U.S. treat North Korea the ame as they did with Sotuh Korea, to help them start over?  

    On another note about the inter-relationship between North -South Koreas,  I believe people should consider the stories from the exiles and  their culture where family reunion is a big motivation for reunification of the two.  We saw that right after the successful evacuation of the Japanese rules in 1949, there were a brief peirod where the both Korean Workers' party were joined.  Had it been not the intrusion of the Cold War superpower, the two Koreas may have worked out their differences more gradual and not to the two extremes, or maybe it will be more like China.

    #43531
    Jasmine Weeks
    Spectator

    Hi Alyssa,  I remember reading form somewhere that Sunshine Policy was revisited in 2017 under the leadership of Moon Jae-in which led to the joint venture in following year Winter Olympics in South Korea.   The initial Sunshine Policy was put to rest under Lee Myun-Bak when North Korea continued its nuclear weapon tests in 2009.  However, the Kaesong Industrial Region started in 2002, was a result of the Sunhine Policy.  The joint venture continued bewteen the two Koreas until 2016 even the Sunhsine policy was rested for a while. There were economical benefits for both Koreas whereby South Korean companies build factories and hired cheap but capable labor from North Korea, in addition to investing assests and equipments in that region.  Kaesong Industrial was closed after the provocation by North Korea, launching its first statelite and testing hydrogen bomb. 

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