Home › Forums › Short Online Seminars › Contemporary China, Spring 2019 › Session #5 - March 26
REQUIRED
Readings
Videos
5a. U.S.-China Relations
5b. Global China
OPTIONAL
Prologue
We have for some time now, been in the midst of a reshuffling of the geopolitical map. With the US dollar and military might losing their hegemonic status (at least the former), the geopolitical landscape is moving towards a multipolar framework. China’s rise and challenge to the US is evidence of this change. This transition has been happening beneath the cacophony and rhetoric about violations of international norms, or the upending of the liberal international order. It has been observed in the fight for control of shipping lanes and trade routes, trade partnerships, special drawing rights, and corporate espionage. There has been a quiet war going on for decades, and the US appears to be losing ground. However, whether China can maintain its gains under the weight of its own fragile growth remains to be seen. As a practical matter, protecting the liberal international order (LIO) means protecting the supremacy of the dollar and wherever possible, the projection of US soft power through the threat of US hard power. Many China hawks in the US may be sitting on the sidelines with glee, as China’s consumer debt skyrockets, to take advantage of the imminent bursting of the bubble. If would be worth considering if the US is in fact facilitating this process along with something akin to the Cloward-Piven Strategy.
How Xi Jinping Sees the World…and Why?
Jinping’s hostility to the liberal International order (LIO) should be understood in similar ways to Putin’s antagonism towards it. Namely, a great deal of diplomatic, military, and covert warfare was undertaken (which continues today) to create the LIO under US leadership, to the detriment of China, and more so to Russia.
China’s newfound position within the LIO is primarily due to its military buildup and resulting ability to project hard power, which has been fueled by its economic growth. Additionally, its foreign policy is driven by domestic policy considerations (Geopolitics 101).
Leaving behind the “century of humiliation” and towards the “Chinese Dream” of being a respected player on the international stage, and creating national harmony within the country (id est, Uygur re-education camps), has meant developing its military and economic capacity, and letting loose its domestic consumer power.
Xi Jinping is using an all of the above approach to leadership, aka, “hybrid approach”.
Bader views China as seeking regional dominance, positioning itself as a leader within Asia, and a strong number 1 or 2 economically (see OBOR); but also seeking to project its hard power beyond its immediate regional concerns. It is worth noting here that China’s rise was to some degree facilitated by the Nixon Shock of 1971, which caused Nixon to famously declare to his colleagues, “We’re all Keynesians now”, helped to export huge sums of US fiat currency into the international system, acting as an escape hatch for all that US inflation, and in the process made China the manufacturing engine of the US, so the latter could go on a consumer spending spree that only slowed down in 2007-8 (read, hit a brick wall). The only problem was, the US, and perhaps in the future China, ignored the problem of the Triffin Dilemma.
The policy goals China is pursuing, the author observes, are more a factor of its history and newfound capacity, rather than its current leader. Some of the author’s observations amount to Barnum statements, in that he essentially points out that China is forging a path and pursuing a strategy that all countries follow: Namely, China seeks to maximize their influence and capacity within an anarchic system, bend rules when they can, break rules when they think they must, and by all means cheat – but don’t get caught doing it.
The author’s criticism of China’s lack of adherence to certain international norms is particularly rich. Take human rights for example. Bader is speaking within the framework of the West’s commitment to human rights, and its global leadership in defending said rights, especially when the West sees other countries (aka, bad actors, regimes, et cetera) not behaving. It can fairly be pointed out that China is violating moral and ethical principles by its treatment of Uygurs, but the question of norms becomes very sticky, and conversations on this topic, regardless of the participants, are always had inside of a vast cathedral made of glass: The Trail of Tears, Japanese Internment, Guantanamo, extraordinary rendition, “non-combatants”, Boer concentration camps, the Irish Potato Famine, the list goes on…. It remains a necessary challenge to call out evil when it is observed (and prevent and stop it if possible), but it cannot be pretended that anyone’s hands are clean.
Bader points to the crux of issue, which all the authors below seem to echo). That is, everything boils down to hard power: Will China exercise it in order to reach its goals? Becoming a revisionist power, as Bader puts it, is defined solely by the use of force as an offensive policy tool, rather than a defensive method of survival.
The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations
In a nutshell: China just will not do what America wants. “Since the early years of this century, however, China's economic liberalization has stalled.” This is diplospeak for, “China is not allowing US businesses to own or control significant swaths of Chinese land or infrastructure, through the ‘free market’, id est, China is being protectionist and we don’t like it.” Many of the criticisms are fair regarding China, but the authors seem to offer a one-dimensional view, unlike Bader, of the nature and motivation of China’s actions.
There is a great deal of irony in the authors criticisms. China’s surveillance control grid is an apropos example. Western control grids are far more subtle, but are nonetheless just as ubiquitous. The surveillance capability that China has is also wielded by the West, albeit in a more discreet way (no thanks to Snowden). The primary difference is that much of the technology sed in the West to spy on people was developed within private corporations with overt and covert funding streams. Further, the authors point out that, “A number of nondemocratic governments - in Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere-have benefited from such obstruction [by the Chinese].” Boloney sandwich needs to be called here. The leaders of Syria and Venezuela were duly elected; and the US is backing its choice for president of Venezuela, despite the fact that he has never been elected to anything.
The authors conclude by suggesting the US exercise “a new degree of humility about” its “ability to change China.” Agreed, but that virtue is not something for which the US is generally known – quite the opposite in fact. “Washington should instead focus more on its own power and behavior, and the power and behavior of its allies and partners. Basing policy on a more realistic set of assumptions about China would better advance U.S. interests and put the bilateral relationship on a more sustainable footing.” I would like to interpret this policy prescription as focusing on domestic matters, like why Flint stills drinks and bathes in poison; and how China will help its people breath clean air and drink clean water.
The Coming Chinese Crackup
Shambaugh asserts that authoritarian rule by Xi Jinping will ultimately have the effect of destabilizing China, primarily because he views the strategies employed by the CCP as unsustainable, and points to the Jiang and Hu administrations as being exemplars of how reform should take place – more democratization and openness, rather than Xi’s autocratic approach. One x-factor in the survival of China’s communist party is technology. How will AI shape the control mechanisms that are being established? Will it prolong their rule, or somehow revolutionize the Chinese consciousness?
To paraphrase, Shambaugh effectively highlights all the reasons that China may collapse under the weight of its own progress: central planning (and the corruption that inevitably accompanies it). However, what is particularly noteworthy about this piece is that it characterizes regime change operations that routinely occur within China and elsewhere, at the hands of Western intelligence agencies, as a conspiratorial view (id est, unfounded and preposterous). Suggesting that China will collapse without some nudging from outside the country is disingenuous.
Did America Get China Wrong?
Perhaps the most even-handed of the policy prescriptions among the authors reviewed here, Wang Jisi simply says, may the best system win. Let China do its thing domestically, unless it acts in a militarily unilateral way that is not defensive, and see if it is as successful as the US at providing for and garnering its citizens loyalty and approval.
Commentary
The real fear lies not in the histrionics of pundits asserting that Trump is upending the liberal international order (because it finished the game with the most gold after WWII and got to make the rules, id est Bretton Woods); it is the fact that a rising multipolar world has been ascendant since at least 2007-8. US dollar hegemony is no longer assured. All those tanks and guns that follow US dollars around the world are no longer as effective as they once were in protecting the liberal international order (see Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria).
This is a good entry point to discuss the Heartland Theory to students, and what role the Washington consensus should play in shaping the liberal international order it created at the end of WWII. In particular, this is a good opportunity to learn the basics of international relations theory, at least as it relates to all countries seizing opportunities to expand their influence, and what constitutes a casus belli? The Us-China relationship offers teachers an enormous amount of perspectives from which to examine the current historical moment, and the role the US can and should play in it.
The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations (Kurt/Ely)“Across the ideological spectrum, we in the U.S. foreign policy community have remained deeply invested in expectations about China-about its approach to economics, domestic politics, security, and global order-even as evidence against them has accumulated. The policies built on such expectations have failed to change China in the ways we intended or hoped.” Why do we keep trying? Is it the sense of imperialism of the past that dominates us still to affect policy? Can we not accept that the competing ideology will continue to resist changes from the outside? While the Chinese economy has skyrocketed, this led to a hardening of the Communist Party ideology. In order for the US to be successful it seems is for China to crack or at least show sustained weakness in its economy. “Short term frustrations” as the authors called it have given sway to long-term harmful and permanent ways of doing business. Even the Trump administration’s attempt to sway them via Comprehensive Economic Dialogues has failed. I agree with the authors’ conclusion that the US needs to seek humility with our ability to change China and instead focus on its own power and behavior. Although I teach at the elementary school level, I could see this article re-written act on grade-level and then bring in https://www.cato.org/human-freedom-index-new a debate about economic and personal freedoms.
In “The View from China,” Wang Jisi starts off with a basic rewrite of my analysis of Kurt/Ely to begin his own analysis. What he states is that maybe China no longer recognizes the US positions on several factors pot-Trump election and that the idea of co-evolution aka “benign competition” be the driver of the handling of domestic affairs. In “Engagement Works” Roy states that Kurt/Ely have an incorrect thesis. The US never intended to shape China into its own image but rather to use China to its advantage. In “Engagement Works,” J. Stapleton Roy basically states that rather than allowing China to take center stage as a global leader, the Unites States can regain that position if its own needs are part of the larger global “we are all in this together” picture and that everyone will benefit not one country at the exclusion of the other.
As Brett has noted, Shambaugh argues that “the endgame of Chinese communist rule has now begun” based on five primary indications: first, the fact that Chinese elites are already fleeing the country; second, the fact that Xi has intensified political repression against the “usual suspects’--Uighurs, intellectuals, etc.; third, his observation that many party loyalists are “just going through the motions” (as outlined in the South China Morning Post article); fourth, party and military corruption, and fifth, his belief that China’s economy is “stuck in a series of systemic traps from which there is no easy exit.” Shambaugh’s reasoning here is that proposed economic reforms are being blocked by entrenched interest groups such as SOE’s and local party cadres. In his view, only political reforms can save China from the fate of the former USSR.
But,to paraphrase Campbell and Ely, Chinese realities have a way of upsetting American expectations. For many years, the authors argue, American-Chinese foreign relations were guided by the idea that “[d]evelopment would spark a virtuous cycle” in which a Chinese middle class would demand new rights and legal reforms. But contrary to expectations, “Beijing responded to the forces of globalization by putting up walls and tightening state control, constricting, rather than reinforcing, the free flow of people, ideas, and commerce.” For example, Chinese authorities have used communications technologies to monitor its people and control access to information.
Campbell and Ely’s arguments support Brown’s claim that the Chinese government’s goal is to develop China’s economy as means to the end of “the creation of a rich, strong, powerful state,” not an open society. This powerful state is one that can ensure security and stability through political repression. As China engages the rest of the world and asserts its strategic space through the BRI, it faces immense risks and rewards. But as long as some nations take aid from China with the belief that these interactions are ”non-normative, non-prescriptive, and based on consent,” and that these aid scenarios offer only “win-win” outcomes, it’s hard to imagine breaking what seems to be a vicious cycle of development and oppression.
My lesson takeaway: not quite so high flown. America represents itself as a democratic--and, yes, moral--world leader, yet it has backed out of the Paris Climate Agreement. Does China have the high ground here? What does world leadership look like in the context of climate change? The videos give us some nice visuals and numbers that could support a lively discussion of what our American moral imperative is in the face of this global crisis.
Hi Folks -
Here is a 20 minute presentation by David Shambaugh that draws on the article you've been asked to read and his book.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DqYtCiJWHxM&feature=youtu.be&list=PLZoSvm2n7tkeB583HbdB7CyPgJ_cL1y7G
Shambaugh has given a couple of other lectures at USC on soft power and China goes global.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sc2Cd-rD7fI
Great article to also get the students thinking about who this player is in Chinese culture, history and current politics. Students today are always curious about if history or even current events are driven by large currents or societal movements or do individuals such as Xi Jinping make a difference? Do world history players like Napoleon or Kaiser Wilhem II make a difference as individuals based on individual decsions or choices? Are these people who make personal decisions on unilateral basis and just go with their intuitions?
It seems like Xi Jingping is not willing to show all of his cards on this one. Is he acting in line with the "party" or is he going on his own? Or is he leading the party with his own personal agenda with them moving along with.
Interestingly, NPR had an article this afternoon on Xi's visit to Europe appearently to talk with individual leaders to make certain individual agreements. It reaveal China's ambitions into the world and the world's ambitions into and towards China. Who is driving who here? But in this visit, the EU leadership seems to make it clear that they are a unified system and not just individual coutnries, especially as it comes to the Belt and Road project. However, at the same time they want to work in and with China.
But it still comes down to people not really knowing what Xi Jinping is going to do next and how will he react or move next? He does not fit into normal paradigms and in each move he makes people wonder. Of course the human rights issues in China seem to not change much, but other issues, especially related to finance and business ventures, there are many continual surprises.
I think this weeks readings and lectures can give us many questions to give to our students, the main one being, "What does the next China look like?"
Of course this is a leading question, and one that seemingly can offer endless discussions or student repsonses. The article comparing the U.S. and China in regards to their interactions and business ventures in and with Africa , "The United States and China in Africa: What does the data say?" is a great example of areas that students today would definitely be surprised with and interested in seeing how China and the U.S. compare really in imports and exports, but also in realtion to Africa and the connections both nations have with a growing economic sphere.
The other area is with the China Belt road; "The Belt and Road: Security Dimensions". The real questions to ask students after reading this article is why? and how? The jury is still out if this is going to work or be a successful venture for China, but they are doing it anyways. Perhaps it is more of the fact that it is going to help the nations it goes across more than it helps China. Maybe that is the point. We tend to see articles and news reports on China that lean towards them doing everything only for China, but maybe we all do that if we are honest, but at the same time China could be doing some global work and positioning like a Marshall Plan, that benefits both. That laying out large amounts of capital and effort to build lasting relationships and infrustructure is a good thing, for China and those China would like to work with, and as some have pointed out in this weeks readings, China will work with or help those who do not necessarilly 100% agree with their agenda idealogies or policies like the the U.S. did with the Marshall Plan in the post ww2 Cold War era.
Steinberg, Julie. Wall Street Journal (Online); New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]21 Mar 2019.
The company's actions have rankled some teachers. Typically, these instructors have displayed maps of the world, including China, that they found on their own. Starting last fall, hundreds began receiving emails or calls from VIPKid stating their maps weren't aligned with Chinese education standards, people familiar with the matter said. Teachers who refuse to adhere to the map standards could have their contracts terminated, after conversations with VIPKid. Map-related dismissals haven't happened, said a person familiar with the company.
A Chinese education company backed by U.S. investors including Kobe Bryant is cracking down on how its Western teachers cover politically fraught topics.
VIPKid, one of China's most valuable online education startups, has put hundreds of its mostly American teachers on notice for using certain maps in their classes with Chinese students, and has severed two teachers' contracts for discussing Taiwan and Tiananmen Square in ways at odds with Chinese government preferences, people familiar with the company say. Since last fall, teachers' contracts state that discussing "politically contentious" topics could be cause for dismissal, according to one reviewed by The Wall Street Journal.
The moves highlight the balance a Chinese company must strike in fulfilling global aspirations while toeing Beijing's line. Five-year-old VIPKid is currently in talks to raise as much as $500 million in new funding from U.S. and other investors that could value the company at roughly $6 billion, people familiar with the fundraising said.
"A company must keep good relations with the government and ideology," said Peter Fuhrman, chief executive of investment firm China First Capital. "But that can cause friction when you're also courting foreign investors, expanding business overseas and employing a large American workforce."
Beijing-based VIPKid says it has more than 60,000 teachers in the U.S. and Canada who teach English to more than 500,000 children ages 4 through 15, who live mostly in China. Teachers work as independent contractors and can earn between $14 and $22 an hour. They must have a bachelor's degree, at least one year of teaching experience and eligibility to work in the U.S. or Canada.
Curricula are provided, and teachers give English-language instruction, sometimes using geography or historical figures. VIPKid's approach is consistent with maps and materials in the Chinese education curriculum, which calls Taiwan a part of China. Textbooks don't mention the military's suppression of the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy demonstrators in 1989, and discussion of it is forbidden.
A spokesman said VIPKid has "an elevated level of responsibility to protect the safety and emotional development of the young children on our platform." The company expects teachers to understand cultural expectations, he said, adding it had to "make a difficult decision" to terminate the contracts of "an exceptionally small number of teachers" who "decided to ignore the needs of their students" and "the preference of their parents."
Western companies including Gap Inc. and hotel giant Marriott International Inc. have been forced to apologize in the past for online communications, websites or merchandise that angered Beijing or Chinese consumers on issues including Taiwan and Tibet .
Chinese education technology attracted $5.3 billion in investment last year, double the amount a year earlier, according to Dow Jones VentureSource data. VIPKid's investors include U.S. hedge-fund firm Coatue Management LLC, venture-capital firm Sequoia Capital, Chinese social giant Tencent Holdings Ltd. and a venture fund co-launched by retired NBA star Kobe Bryant.
Will Rodgers, a 26-year-old American teacher based in Thailand, said he discussed Tiananmen Square twice during VIPKid lessons about famous Chinese landmarks. First, he told a 12-year-old student "the Chinese government jailed and killed many people just for protesting." He then showed a 15-year-old student photos and video footage of the protest, and his contract was terminated. Mr. Rodgers said he doesn't agree with VIPKid's stance, but doesn't blame the company for ending his contract.
Another American teacher's contract was terminated earlier this year after he told students that Taiwan was a separate country, according to people familiar with his case. A third teacher received a call from VIPKid after telling a student that Tibet, an autonomous region in China with a history of separatist activity, is a country, during a lesson on China's neighbors, according to a person familiar with the matter. He was told on the call he should refer to Tibet as part of China.
People familiar with VIPKid say it monitors classes for missteps over political content. Another person familiar with the matter said the company uses artificial intelligence to determine material students find engaging and to protect them from inappropriate behavior.
Some teachers and VIPKid investors say that education from foreign teachers, even if it is screened, can benefit students because they get exposed to other cultures. Rob Hutter, a founder and managing partner of Learn Capital, an early investor in VIPKid, said the company is trying to take a common-sense approach by teaching uncontroversial content.
"No matter what nation you're teaching in, there are going to be things that we need to be thoughtful about," he said. "Even in American classrooms, there are things you cannot discuss."
Write to Julie Steinberg at [email protected] and Shan Li at [email protected]
Phillip makes some great points on the Kurt/Ely analysis in regards to using this with elementary students, which would be useful for any High School classrooms. Asking students to critically look at the narrative we commonly say or hear that the U.S. drives Chinese policy and economics and that we are still trying to believe that this is what happens.
It does raise some good discussion topics on how we can bring this conversation to post WW2 Japan and Germany and ask how much or how little did the U.S. influence those countries directly or did each, like China make more of their own decisions for the good of their own countries because they have their own goals, successes and drive to be who they are and chose who they want to be based on their own directions.
I think students today are well aware of the products they use and that they are most often coming from China but that they are not fully aware of how much of this is Chinese decisions or U.S. influence. I think many of my students are aware of some of the intentions of countries trying to influence other countries and the debates or the rhetoric being expressed by leaders. I think it is a great time to make them aware of this debate and ask students to look who they think they is driving who or is China just doing things that make things better in China and that is what they have always done.
I am interested in Art History and the historiography of it. Naturally, I was drawn to the article from Quartz Africa that suggests that African artists, and many other Africans are concerned about the more recent happenings with geopolitics between these two countries. As it was mentioned in our discussion last evening (3-26-19), China is interested in Africa's natural resouces. Let's be honest, the idea of conquest and contest have been around since the first two humans. Dr. Dube mentioned that the Republic of the Congo is an interesting place and sought after by the Chinese for cobalt, which is used for solar and wind power.
The African artist, Soi expressed his concern and "frustration" for Chinese artists who attempt to represent his country. The article goes on to say that many Africans are suspicious about the relations that are happening within their country and China. Quartz Africa continues with the notion that this is just a "spy game" and the Chinese are scoping out Africa, and may even go as far as being cynical? about who will be running the country/
This article can easily be used in my Economics class and World History showcasing how governments can rapidly change, and quite often over history, this has occurred numberous times. So I think a great question to pose to my students could be, "How does an African artist who seemingly has no political ties in relation to the art world, have a stake in the political arena?
This comment piggybacks on the previous post. Perhaps, because art is self-expression, Soi may be greatly concerned for this very element in what he has created over time. Self-expression is what Art and Art History is all about, and why many people choose this form of employment for their career. When I studied his work throughout the article, I found myself googling him and saw more interesting pieces that caught my eye.
I want to show my students and ask them, "Do you think that Soi and other artists are in fear of what their future holds if China becomes more involved politically and economically?" Also, I want to extend this to all artists who display self-expression. To what extent does China allow its citizens to be "self-expressive"?
From today's NY Times:
I like the ladybug cap. 🙂
The cover story from Economist has an intereting article about China's belt and road project. To begin, the author states and defines what is meant by "belt". The belt is the land area that China is eyeing for their advancement projects. The "road" is the waterway and the sea route. Many countries see this massive project or initiative to be problematic because they are suspect that the Chinese plan involves more of a takeover. Since Chinese citizens are not very likely or encouraged to voice their concerns, this may become a fertile ground for Chinese expansion. Hegemony becomes quite risky and some countries are not willing to take the risk.
One of these countries is France. Their concern is that with the Chinese belt and road, it could be easily transferred into a single-sighted project without a lot of input from the very countries that China is promising to benefit. The balance of power may shift and could concern other countries and alliances. However, United States is working more closely with China so America should continue working with the Chinese. In the classroom, it could be a great discussion with either World History or Economic students. China is ever present with my students and their fond electtonics.
This was another article from the Economist, and I enjoyed some of the ideas presented. Much of my family resides outside of the United States, and Than Swe reflects many of my family members sentiments regarding our nation. Some say that the US considers itself, "all that" and we are cavalier in our approach of handling foreign policy. The map featured and highlighted planned railways, oil and gas pipelines, and ports. Just like my family, a dichtomy exists between ideas of American intentions and whether they are positive for their country, or negative.
The article argues that the Chinese intentions seem to be colonial in nature. Throughout history, colonism has been witnessed throughout the world and with the featured map, one can certainly ask and ponder the Chinese colony question. Others may argue that this massive buildup in infrastructure that China has initiated is good for citizens of other countries. The citizens, after all, enjoy the benefits that Chinese capital has brought to the country. However, some see it and become resentful. The Economist goes on to report that much of the capital expenditure Chinese spending does not get reported, and therefore, can be suspicious in their overall intentions.
This question of colonism vs good will and expansion could be a great discussion for World History and Economics students. I am thinking of parallels between India and the United States.
This is an interesting post, Brett. As you mentioned that the Chinese "Namely, China seeks to maximize their influence and capacity within an anarchic system, bend rules when they can, break rules when they think they must, and by all means cheat – but don’t get caught doing it." is more of how China sees itself as a nation. Internally, China throughout history has been insecure even though the country is a.mbitious. Essentially, their economic options did not transend their political choices and options. It is fun to watch what will happen with US relations with China