ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOKS

"Up-to-date analyses, encyclopedic in scope, by some of the world's leading authorities."
Perry Link, *University of California Riverside*

"The *Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Communist Party* is an invaluable resource for anyone who wants to understand how China is governed and how its political system has evolved over the past seven decades. Willy Wo-Lap Lam has assembled an unrivalled group of China scholars and produced one of the most illuminating volumes on contemporary China."
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Arthur Waldron, *University of Pennsylvania*

Whilst the Chinese Communist Party is one of the most powerful political institutions in the world, it is also one of the least understood, due to the party's secrecy and tight control over the archives, the press and the Internet. Having governed the People's Republic of China for nearly 70 years though, much interest remains in how this quintessentially Leninist party governs one-fifth of the world and runs the world's second-largest economy.

The *Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Communist Party* gives a comprehensive and multi-faceted picture of the party's traditions and values – as well as its efforts to stay relevant in the twenty-first century. It uses a wealth of contemporary data and qualitative analysis to explore the intriguing relationship between the party on the one hand, and the government, the legal and judicial establishment and the armed forces, on the other. Tracing the influence of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, as well as Mao Zedong, on contemporary leaders ranging from Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, the sections cover: the party's history and traditions; how the party works and seeks to remain relevant; major policy arenas; the CCP in the twenty-first century.

The *Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Communist Party* will be of interest to students and scholars of Chinese Politics, Asian Politics, Political Parties and International Relations.

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POLITICS / CHINESE STUDIES

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Edited by Willy Wo-Lap Lam

For Grace, Ching-Wen and Wen-Chung

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Silenced voices

Dru C. Gladney

Introduction

Governing the Uyghur in China has often pushed in two quite distinct directions, secularism or separatism. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has regularly suggested that Uyghur militants have killed and are threatening to kill other Chinese citizens in the name of radical Islam, drawing direct parallels to violent events in the Middle East and Europe. Since the end of the nineteenth century, China has been engaged in an unremitting project of nationalization and secularization that includes, among other things, emancipation from its imperial past, engagement with Western political institutions, and establishment of its sovereignty over its bounded territory. One recent challenge to this nationalist project, with roots in the early twentieth century, is that of a widespread separatism movement among one Muslim group known as the Uyghur. That the largest Muslim group in China, known as the Hui, have not participated in, nor been sympathetic to, such a movement speaks volumes regarding the diversity of Islamic identity and practice in China over the last century in response to state projects of nationalization and secularization.

Most scholars agree that the post-Cultural Revolution period in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region was welcomed by most Xinjiang residents due to the harsh treatment of minorities and religious practitioners between 1966 and 1976. Indeed, many Muslims point to the 20 years of discrimination against religious practice since the initiation of the Religious System Reform Campaign in 1958, which led throughout the country to the further consolidation and restriction of religious practice. In the wake of the market liberalization policies of Deng Xiaoping, cultural and religious practice also flourished, leading to widespread mosque-building and the revival of religious education in the region. It was during this period that most of the mosques in the region were built or reopened, Islamic training of young Imams permitted, and pilgrimages to Mecca resumed. Indeed, there are many residents of Xinjiang, Uyghurs included, who continue to strongly support the Deng Xiaoping reforms as they have been continued under Jiang Zemin, Hu Juntao, and now Xi Jinping. As loyal citizens, they see the dramatic progress made since the end of the Cultural Revolution and generally share in the government's

vision of a modernized, developed Xinjiang region. Working not only in the state sector as cadres, teachers, production corps farmers, and factory workers, but also in the growing private sector in private and semi-private small businesses, these supporters of the state's development program are generally quite unwilling to listen to any criticism of state policies, especially from outsiders or disgruntled minorities.

Given the lack of public polling or uncensored media in the region, it is difficult to ascertain if these supporters are a silent majority or a tiny minority, speaking out in support of state policies because it serves their interest. Nevertheless, the Deng reform era in general can be characterized as a period of heightened loyalty to the state and new-found optimism after the previous 20 years of internal chaos and repression, similar in many respects to the period of relative loyalty when Xinjiang was first brought into the PRC and established as an Autonomous Region.

Growing Uyghur resentment from the late 1980s and mid-1990s

However, in the late 1980s and mid-1990s, this period of loyalty gave way to increasing expressions of dissent, not only among Uyghur but also among a wide cross-section of local residents that felt the northwest was not keeping pace with the rapid development of the rest of the country. Many Uyghurs were particularly disappointed that the independence of the former Soviet Central Asian Republics in 1991 did not lead to independence or at least increased autonomy in their own Autonomous Region. Throughout the early and mid-1990s, increasing expressions of "voice" demonstrated these concerns from university protests to greater ethnic and civil unrest. Whether there were smaller, unreported incidents in the past, the mid-1990s witnessed a number of public expressions of dissent and dissatisfaction with state policies in the region.

The 1990s period of voiced opposition began with the report of a major uprising in Akto County (near Kashgar) in April 1990, that official reports stated involved an "armed counter-revolutionary rebellion" suppressed by the People's Liberation Army that led to 22 deaths.[1] In 1995, Chinese People's Police reported finding a large weapons cache, and in May 1996, a Xinjiang People's Political Consultative Conference official was assassinated, all later attributed to "East Turkestan" terrorists (McNeal 2001).

In the spring of 1996, the *Xinjiang Daily* reported five serious social eruptions in the region since February 1996, with a crackdown that rounded up 2,773 terrorist suspects, 6,000 lbs of explosives, and 31,000 rounds of ammunition. Overseas Uyghur groups claimed that over 10,000 were arrested in the round-up, with over 1,000 killed.[2] The largest protest from February 2 to 8, 1996, was sparked by a Chinese raid on an evening *Mashrap* cultural meeting, where young Uyghur men and women gather for prayer, singing of religious and folk songs, and feasting.[3] Protests against the arrests made during the meeting led to 120 deaths and over 2,500 arrests. Immediately following the uprising and crackdown in Yining, on February 25, the day of Deng Xiaoping's memorial speech, in a well-coordinated operation, three bombs exploded simultaneously on three buses in downtown Urumqi leading to 20 civilian deaths and scores of injured (including some Uyghurs), with the subsequent execution of eight Uyghurs allegedly responsible for the bombings (McNeal 2001).

Later that spring, the violence came to Beijing when on March 7 and then again on March 8, two separate bombs exploded on public buses. The first bomb in Xidan claimed three lives with ten injured, while the second bomb killed two. The bombs were timed to take place during the Chinese National People's Congress and were widely attributed to Uyghur separatists, though this has never been independently verified and no group has ever claimed

responsibility.[4] On May 29, 1996 the pro-government *mullah* of Kashgar's Idgah mosque, Arunkhanji, and his son were stabbed by knife-wielding Uyghur militants, on May 27 there was another attack on a senior government official, and in September of the same year six Uyghur government officials were killed by other Uyghurs in Yecheng.

The Yining uprising on February 7, 1997, and the subsequent bombings in Urumqi and Beijing, were heavily covered by the world's media (*The Economist* 1997b). This distinguishes the late 1990s events from on-going problems in the region in the mid-1980s that met with little media coverage. In the late 1990s, the government responded with a host of arrests and new policy announcements. In Spring 1998, the National People's Congress passed a New Criminal Law that redefined "counter-revolutionary" crimes to be "crimes against the state," liable to severe prison terms and even execution. Included in "crimes against the state" were any actions considered to involve "ethnic discrimination" or "stirring up anti-ethnic sentiment" (Amnesty International 1999). Many human rights activists have argued that this is a thinly veiled attempt to criminalize "political" actions and to make them appear as illegal as traffic violations, supporting China's claims that it holds "no political prisoners." Since any minority activity could be regarded as stirring "anti-ethnic feeling," many ethnic activists have suggested that the New Criminal Law was easily turned against them.

The "Strike Hard Campaign," launched in Beijing in April 1997, was originally intended to clamp down on crime and corruption, and included severe restrictions on religious practice.[5] These campaigns, according to an April 1999 Amnesty International report, have led to 210 capital sentences and 190 executions of Uyghurs since 1997 (Amnesty International 1999).

Until 2009, the 1997 riot in Xining described above marked the apex of rioting and civil unrest among the Uyghur. Indeed, after 1997 there was a marked decline in Xinjiang civil unrest and so-called separatist events, perhaps because of the government's harsh crackdown and arrest of prominent Uyghur activists. On August 11, 1999, Rebiya Kadeer – a well-known Uyghur businesswoman and a delegate to the 1995 UN Fourth World Conference for Women in Beijing, who was scheduled to meet with a United States Congressional Research Service delegation to the region – was arrested for "revealing state secrets" (Ian 1999). Human rights activists claim that she was merely handing over Xinjiang news items previously published in the official news media to be taken back to her husband, Sidiq Rouzi, who was living in exile in Washington, D.C., and working for the U.S. government funded radio stations, Radio Free Asia and Voice of America. After reviewing her case, Amnesty International concluded that there was not enough evidence to detain her and launched an international campaign in the spring of 2002, that eventuated in her release in March 2005 (Amnesty International 2000). Although Beijing hoped her arrest and exile would silence her voice, she has been active among the nearly million-strong Uyghur diaspora in helping to organize international fora including the World Uyghur Congress, which has elected her twice as its President.[6] Another voice for the Uyghur that the Chinese state has sought to silence through arrest and detention is the China Minzu University economist, Ilham Tohti. After being accused of "separatism" for his class lectures and having hosted a blocked website in 2006, Uyghur Online (www.uighurbiz. net), Tohti was sentenced to life imprisonment and his assets seized in September 2016.[7]

Despite on-going tensions and frequent reports of isolated terrorist acts, there has been no evidence that any of these actions have been aimed at disrupting the economic development of the region. Most confirmed incidents have been directed against Han Chinese security forces, recent Han Chinese émigrés to the region, and even Uyghur Muslims perceived to be too closely collaborating with the Chinese government.[8] Most analysts agree that China is not vulnerable to the same ethnic separatism that split the former Soviet Union. But few doubt that should China fall apart, it would divide, like the USSR, along centuries old ethnic, linguistic,

regional, and cultural fault lines (Gladney 1995: 1–8). If China did fall apart, Xinjiang would split in a way that, according to Anwar Yusuf, President of the Eastern Turkistan National Freedom Center in Washington, D.C., "would make Kosovo look like a birthday party."[9] Uyghur organizations have sought to pressure various U.S. government administrations to support the Uyghur cause, with varying degrees of success, arguably more so with the Bush administration than with Obama's, given the successful release of Rebiya Kadeer. Many Uyghurs with whom this author has spoken hope that the Trump administration, with its tougher talk on China and seemingly public support for Taiwan, might be more supportive of Uyghur efforts to press China on human rights and greater freedom. Yet many fear that with the U.S. and China cooperating on a war on terrorism, there is little real hope for U.S. support of Uyghur human rights' issues. The Obama administration showed less interest in the Uyghur cause than the Bush administration, refusing to meet with any Uyghur representatives, and keeping the Dalai Lama at a polite, but safe distance.

Since the high point of the late 1990s expressions of voice and ethnic violence, there has been a gradual decline in the scale and number of incidents. Documented separatist and violent incidents in Xinjiang have dropped off dramatically since the late 1990s. Philip Pan reported in a July 14, 2002 *Washington Post* interview that local Xinjiang security officials were only able to cite three relatively small occurrences (Pan 2002). Interestingly, despite increasing violence in the Xi Jinping era, few have noted that despite many incidents of ethnic and civil unrest in the region, not one significant terrorist attack against any strategic infrastructural target (oil refinery, pipeline, railroad, dam, or bridge) has ever been documented, nor have any local or international incidents been positively identified to have been orchestrated by any international Uyghur or Islamic organization. Uyghur acts of violence seem to be increasingly inspired by Jihadist Islam, but not coordinated by any single group or organization. In addition, visitors to the region have increasingly reported a sense of disillusionment and disappointment among activists. One acquaintance mentioned to this author as early as August 2001, "We've given up on independence, we just want to emigrate." Since then, many frustrated Uyghur, especially young men, have tried to leave through Pakistan, India, and Burma, with various rates of success. A key issue influencing Uyghur loyalty and voice has been the rise of Chinese nationalism, particularly in the later reform period under Xi Jinping. The following discussion will address some of the complexities of Chinese nationalism affecting the expression of Uyghur voices today and many of their reasons to seek outlets for resistance to Chinese rule.[10]

Chinese nationalisms

In the broad body of literature on nationalism, there are two main schools of thought. The modernist school of thought focuses on actions undertaken by individuals, mostly intellectuals, with the specific purpose of engendering sentiments of nationalism within a specific group of people (Cole 2002: 453). Michael Hechter (2000: 312) has described this as "rational nationalism," in that it often entails individuals acting even violently for the instrumentalist goals for the greater good of the "nation."[11] In other words, the modernist view is that nationalism is in a sense *man-made*, and born out of the structural conditions of modern society. The primordialist school of thought focuses on the natural tendency of humans to organize into distinct groupings based on an affinity of birth (Llobera 1999: 3). The primordialist view is that nationalism is *inherent* in human beings, and is a natural phenomenon. It is generic to humanity, and not constructed by history or human-inspired political movements.

The study of the origin of nationalism tends to lend itself to the modernist point of view, because of the artificiality of national identity (Guo 2004). In China, this is consistent with the

fact that the concept of nationality only developed in the late Qing dynasty. Chow *et al.* state, "Chinese intellectuals looked to language, custom, history, and religion for the common bond of a nation. They found none" (Chow *et al.* 2001). Nationalism, like Western ideas of "democracy," "science," and even "religion," were introduced to China during its late nineteenth-century period of opening to the West. As this author has suggested elsewhere (Gladney 1996: 5), "nationalism" with Chinese characteristics can be seen to be, in Partha Chatterjee's (1986) terms, a "derivative discourse" introduced to China, and much of Asia, as a result of and response to Western imperialist expansion. China has had to negotiate its response to Western nationalism, creating several kinds of uniquely Chinese nationalisms, not unlike China's own brand of "socialism" and "communism," which were, like nationalism, Western exports to China. Consequently, the concept of *hanzu*, or "people of Han lineage," was artificially created by anti-Manchu scholars to attack the Qing dynasty (Chow *et al.* 2001: 75). Influenced by the Western concept of "race," these revolutionary scholars began to search for new identities for the Chinese nation "in order to articulate a distinction between the Manchus and themselves" (Gladney 1996: 180). Since its creation, the concept of *hanzu* has been utilized for a number of political purposes, including resistance to the Japanese during the Kuomintang's rule. Thus, most authors view nationalism from the early 1900s to the end of the Mao era in the 1970s as inspired and promoted by the state (Dittmer and Kim 1993; Chow *et al.* 2001). (See Chapter 4, "The CCP's Use and Abuse of Nationalism.")

However, although national identity in China is inherently a modern construct, the dynamics of nationalism have evolved over time. For example, bottom-up nationalism, which is popularly based, supports the idea that national identity can originate from the people, as posited by primordialist theory (Gries 2004). As described by Clifford Geertz, this theory posits that people are born with certain proclivities toward language, religion, and even political activism.[12]

In fact, Peter Gries argues that the emergence of this popular nationalism has become a threat to the government, resulting in the formation of "pragmatic nationalism" in recent years (Gries 2004: 116). Guo also notes that cultural nationalism, though primordialist in nature, is often an extension of state nationalism in China (Guo 2004: 53). Thus, the lines between primordialist and modernist thought are blurred in the analysis of contemporary Chinese nationalism, requiring one to gain a more nuanced understanding of whether nationalism is a top-down or bottom-up phenomenon.

The following four categories of nationalism are selected for examination: top-down or state nationalism, Han nationalism, bottom-up or popular nationalism, and utilitarian nationalism. The analysis of nationalism among the Uyghur in China requires examining these topics in depth, because each category sheds light on a unique aspect of Chinese national identity (which includes both Han and minorities). Furthermore, although the four categories are distinct and seemingly unrelated, they should be viewed as a whole in order to understand the various mechanisms through which nationalism is constructed.

Top-down nationalism

One way of analyzing state nationalism is to examine the state's cultural policies and their effects on national identity that come from the top and move downward toward the people. The Uyghur scholar Enze Han presents an interesting analysis of state nationalism by distinguishing between three periods of "nation-building": (1) The tolerant and pluralistic policies of the early years, (2) The cultural destruction and political repression of the Cultural Revolution, and (3) The return to a more pluralistic approach, but with significant limitations in today's society.

During the first stage, the CCP's policies toward ethnic minorities were relatively inclusive (Han 2013: 50). Although the CCP did not include a clause allowing ethnic minorities to pursue self-determination in its constitution, minority languages were promoted and protected. For example, Article 53 of the Common Program, the provisional constitution for the PRC passed in 1949, "guaranteed ethnic minorities the right to develop and use their native languages and scripts … and promised government assistance in those efforts" (Han 2013: 52). In addition, the 1952 General Program for the Implementation of Regional Autonomy, the 1953 Election Law, and the PRC Constitution of 1954 all mandated proportional minority membership in legislative bodies, pledged that ethnic minorities would have the same rights as the Han majority, and banned discrimination based on ethnicity (Guo and Guo 2008: 140).

During the Cultural Revolution, many of these policies were reversed. The UC Berkeley Political Scientist, Lowell Dittmer (Dittmer and Kim 1993: 89), noted, "During the Cultural Revolution, radical factions of the CCP grew impatient with the slow pace in national integration." Bilingual education for ethnic minorities was either stopped entirely or drastically curtailed, ethnic minority organizations were disbanded, and passages dealing with minority autonomy in the Constitution were eliminated. Many autonomous units were dissolved and ethnic minority leaders deposed. Most importantly, the suffering caused by these policies created irreparable damage to the relations between the Han and ethnic minorities, and "many of the wounds from this period would take a long time to heal, if ever" (Han 2013: 112).

The return to more tolerant and pluralistic policies began after the death of Mao in 1976 (Han 2013: 130). Members of the old minority elites were restored to their previous positions in government, legal reforms provided more institutionalized autonomy and rights for various ethnic minority groups, and bilingualism was once again permitted and promoted (Han 2013: 132). In addition, affirmation action for minority students applying to university, exceptions to the one-child policy, and quotas for representation in the government were all instituted to ensure equality between ethnic minorities and the Han (Lee *et al.* 2012: 89). In recent years, it appears as though the government not only accepts minorities, but intends to highlight China's diversity on the international level through supporting initiatives such as creating films on ethnic minorities and developing ethnic tourism (Montefiore 2013).

However, despite the many policies favoring minorities, many authors agree that these policies are only superficial attempts at promoting equality, and in effect, minorities continue to be marginalized in society (Guo and Guo 2008; Lee *et al.* 2012; Han 2013). Some authors even criticize the Chinese government's lack of proactive and effective policy as a deliberate neglect, because it is obvious that the laws governing ethnic-minority cultural rights and political autonomy are becoming increasingly inadequate in the context of the rapid economic and social change in China (Wasserstrom 2010: 77). For example, although preferential university admission for minority students is still in place, the system through which the government would automatically assign jobs to university graduates is not (Wasserstrom 2010: 80). Thus, ethnic minority students often find themselves at a disadvantage when competing with Han Chinese students for jobs that require substantial proficiency in Mandarin Chinese (Wasserstrom 2010: 81). In addition, with economic development focused in the urban centers where Han Chinese are the majority, more and more ethnic minorities, who are disproportionately male, have chosen to leave their villages for economic opportunities (Zheng 1999). This has ultimately threatened the survival of ethnic minority culture, because many of these men do not return to village life and instead choose to assimilate into the Han culture and their way of living (Zheng 1999).

Han nationalism

As discussed previously, the concept of *hanzu*, or the "Han identity," is undoubtedly artificial and highly politicized. The CCP, like the Kuomintang (KMT) and the revolutionaries before them, has utilized the Han identity to create a sense of pride among people who supposedly share Han cultural values, and to gain support for their political agenda of unification (Gladney 1996: 188). Thus, the boundaries between cultural nationalism and state nationalism are undoubtedly blurred because the two categories are closely related (Gladney 1996: 180). However, whereas state nationalism focuses on policies directed at ethnic minorities, cultural nationalism focuses on the indirect subjugation of ethnic minorities – for example, through the portrayal of the Han as superior, and the indirect pressures on ethnic minorities to assimilate. From a broader perspective, the CCP has effectively combined cultural and state nationalism to create a new type of nationalism – Han nationalism (Zheng 1999: 214). Essentially, this type of nationalism is more Han-centric than intentionally discriminatory.

From the beginning of the People's Republic, the Han people have been celebrated by the Communist Party as the "vanguard of the people's revolution" (Gladney 1990). A cable issued by the Central Party Propaganda Office of the New China News Agency in 1949 states,

> The Han occupy the majority population of the country; moreover, the Han today are the major force in China's revolution. Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, the victory of China's people's democratic revolution mainly relied on the industry of the Han people.
>
> *(Gladney 1996: 182)*

In the effort to recognize ethnic minorities in the Ethnic Identification Project, the Chinese government classified minority groups according to what historical development stage it considered them to be at, and the Han majority group was classified as the one that had progressed furthest into the feudal stage, while other groups were labeled "primitive," "slave," or "feudal" (Chow et al. 2001: 156). Though today there are laws prohibiting the explicit discrimination of ethnic minorities, Han superiority is still asserted in implicit ways.

In a subtler way, the policies of the CCP today assert the superiority of the Han by pressuring ethnic minorities to adopt the Han language and customs. Many authors refer to the assimilation of ethnic minorities as "Sinification," or *hanhua* (Gladney 1995; Han 2013). The Uyghur scholar Enze Han notes,

> Today, it is very hard for younger-generation ethnic-minority people to grow up in a monolingual environment. Mass media, modern communication channels, pop culture, and all the conveniences and excitements offered by contemporary Chinese society all require one, especially a young person, to conform, acculturate, or assimilate into the majority Han language and culture.
>
> *(Han 2013: 122)*

Recent nation-building policies such as the prohibition of under-18-year-olds from praying at mosques and the banning of civil servants and students from fasting during the month of Ramadan are examples of even stronger measures taken to accelerate Sinification (Rauhala 2014).

Additionally, the dynamics of the Han identity under the CCP reflect the purposes of Han nationalism. As this author has argued, "the identification of certain groups within China as

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'minorities' and the recognition of the Han as a 'unified' majority played a fundamental role in forging a unified Chinese nation, because minorities were induced to follow the Han example" (Gladney 1996: 185). Similarly, Chow notes,

> This myth [of a *hanzu*] also sustains a belief that there is a majority ethnic group that is running the government, therefore justifying domination over "minority ethnic groups" such as the Tibetans and the Uyghurs, who are "less civilized and advanced."
>
> *(Chow et al. 2001: 160)*

However, Chow also points out that the Han identity "has allowed political leaders to hide conflicts and tensions between ethnic groups within the *hanzu*" (Chow et al. 2001: 160). Therefore, Han identity is simultaneously inclusive and exclusive – reflecting the CCP's desire to consolidate power in the "Han majority" and weaken the autonomy of ethnic minorities.

Bottom-up nationalism

Whereas state nationalism and Han nationalism focus on the dynamics of ethnic identity, bottom-up or popular nationalism and utilitarian nationalism focus on allegiance to the state. In some ways, these differences can be demarcated as internal and external nationalism – where internal nationalism refers to how one ethnic group within a country perceives themselves in comparison to other ethnic groups, and external nationalism is how citizens of a country perceive themselves in relation to other countries.

Although many Western scholars insist that Chinese nationalism has always been a top-down phenomenon, it is clear that popular nationalism has been prevalent throughout modern Chinese history, and in fact, has defined much of its course. The Boxer Rebellion in 1900, for example, was an uprising in northern China against the spread of Western and Japanese influence led by the Society of the Righteous and Harmonious Fists, a secret vigilante group (Wei and Liu 2001). In the 1890s, China had given territorial and commercial concessions in this area to several European nations, and the Boxers blamed their poor standard of living on foreigners who were colonizing their country. This rebellion, as one of the first instances in modern Chinese history where the masses united to protest against foreign imperialism, set the precedent for popular nationalism through the end of the twentieth century and provided inspiration for other anti-imperialist protests, such as the May Fourth Movement in 1919, where students protested the Chinese government's weak response to the Treaty of Versailles (Wei and Liu 2001: 129). In other words, the Boxer Rebellion and May Fourth Movement gave rise to the "victim narrative" that united the Chinese people with the idea that China needed to be strong in order to avoid being continually victimized by foreign powers.

Since its creation, the CCP has relied upon popular nationalism to gain and maintain support. In line with Marxist thought, much of its success in the Chinese Civil War came from its ability to appeal to the masses – indeed, the CCP positioned itself as the "party of the people" with the goal to "liberate" the masses from oppression by the KMT and imperialist forces (Zheng 1999: 115). Thus, from a pro-CCP perspective, the Chinese Civil War is often portrayed as a nationalist revolution from the masses.

The lines between popular and state nationalism became even less defined after the 1949 "liberation" by the CCP. The cult of personality achieved by Mao Zedong, combined with the lasting fervor of revolution, led to popular nationalism defined by fanaticism and xenophobia (Ouyang 2005: 151–175). When allegiance to the state became threatened, Mao began the

Cultural Revolution in an attempt to revive nationalism through purging remnants of capitalist and traditional elements from Chinese society (Wu 2008). Although initiated by Mao, the Cultural Revolution can be viewed as a combination of popular and state nationalism. For example, the Red Guards, one of the primary agents of the Cultural Revolution, were independently formed by students at Tsinghua Middle School in Beijing (Wu 2008: 472).

Utilitarian nationalism

Popular nationalism, however, is not always beneficial for the state. Just as the masses can rally behind anger toward the actions of foreign countries, they can also unite to express their dissatisfaction toward the state. Both the Boxer Rebellion and May Fourth Movement, for example, expressed anger toward the Chinese government in addition to foreign countries. In a more contemporary example, although the protests against Japan's claims over the Diaoyu or Senkaku islands were inherently anti-Japanese, protesters were also largely unsatisfied by the Chinese government's response. In fact, in the 1996 national bestseller *China Can Say No*, the authors maintain that "China has been too warm and accommodating towards Japan" and implicitly condemn the government for suppressing popular anti-Japanese protests (Gries 2004).

Popular nationalism also appears to be undermining the state's agency. Gries states, "In China today, popular networks are challenging the state's hegemony over nationalism, threatening to rupture the Chinese nation-state" (Gries 2004: 134). For example, in the midst of popular protests about the 1999 Belgrade bombing, 2001 spy plane collision, and more recent island disputes, Chinese leaders had no choice but to condemn foreign nations and adopt a hard-line approach to discerning who was "right" and who was "wrong" (Gries 2004: 135). As a result, the CCP recognized that utilitarian nationalism could be a double-edged sword and began approaching nationalism in a more careful way, leading to what scholars such as Peter Gries and Suisheng Zhao call "pragmatic nationalism" (Gries 2004; Zhao 2004).

Utilitarian nationalism is, in essence, pragmatic in nature. It does not have a fixed, objectified, or defined content, and is not driven by any ideology, religious beliefs, or other abstract ideas (Gries 2004: 140). Instead, it is a tool of the communist state to bolster the faith of Chinese people and hold the country together during the period of rapid and turbulent transformation from a communist to a post-communist society (Zhao 2004: 130). For example, in response to popular nationalist calls for the government to take a tough position against the United States and Japan, CCP leaders have mainly adopted a two-pronged strategy (Zhao 2004: 154). On the one hand, they have tolerated and even encouraged the expression of liberal nationalism to make their own policy positions more credible to the U.S. and Japan on issues involving China's vital interests such as the Taiwan issue (Zhao 2004: 155). On the other hand, the state has been very cautious to prevent the nationalist sentiment of Chinese people from getting out of hand and cause backlash in both domestic and foreign affairs (Gries 2004: 140). To make sure that the government's policy is not dictated by emotional nationalist rhetoric on the streets, they have described nationalism as a force that must be "channeled" in its expressions, including restraining or even banning popular anti-American and anti-Japanese demonstrations (Zhao 2004: 158).

China's response to the EP-3 spy plane incident in April 2000 is a good example of this. On the one hand, Beijing's public stance was particularly uncompromising on the demand that the spy plane crew would only be released after a formal apology by the U.S. government (Zhao 2004: 160). However, Secretary Powell did not apologize, only mentioning that "we regret that the Chinese plane did not get down safely, and we regret the loss of the life of that Chinese

pilot," and instead only emphasized expediting the resolution of the situation (Best *et al.* 2001). In the end, the CCP, careful to avoid a repeat of the anti-U.S. demonstrations after the 1999 embassy bombing in Belgrade, finally accepted the "very sorry" in Ambassador Prueher's letter as close as an equivalent to an apology that they would get, even though the translation of "very sorry" in Chinese (*baoqian*) is significantly less severe than "daoqian," the Chinese expression of "apology" that Beijing demanded initially (Best *et al.* 2001: 5). This author, while serving as the inaugural Dean of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, personally appointed by Admiral Prueher (who later served as the U.S. Ambassador to China, 1999–2001), was surprised to learn from the Admiral that he held the highest respect for Chinese restraint during that unfortunate incident. Later, in 1999, at an informal dinner at Admiral Prueher's home in Honolulu in honor of a visit by the late Mayor of Shanghai, Wang Daohan, Admiral Prueher once again expressed his regret for the unfortunate incident and his great admiration for the Chinese people.

These examples are testimonies to the CCP's utilitarian flexibility. The two-pronged strategy of appearing tough but acting in a calculated manner has allowed the state to contain popular nationalism (Gries 2004: 150). As a result, the rise of nationalism has not made Chinese foreign policy particularly aggressive or irrational. As the middle class grows, Chinese leaders will be increasingly constrained by the rise of popular nationalist sentiments, making utilitarian nationalism even more important (Zhao 2004: 172).

Uyghur resistance to Chinese rule

In the summer of 2002, both the United States and the United Nations supported China's claim that an organization known as the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) should be recognized as an international terrorist organization (Eckholm 2002: 1). It is important to note, however, that China makes little distinction between separatists, terrorists, and civil rights activists – whether they are Uyghurs, Tibetans, Taiwanese, or Falun Gong Buddhists. One person's terrorist may be another's freedom fighter. Are the restive Uyghurs of Xinjiang terrorists, separatists, or freedom fighters? How can the incidents of recent years be seen in the context of the Chinese efforts to integrate the region in the course of two decades of the post-Deng reforms?

After denying the problem for decades and stressing instead China's "national unity," official reports and the state-run media began in early 2001 to detail terrorist activities in the regions officially known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (*People's Daily* 2001).[13] Prior to the release of a 2009 White Paper by the State Council, and the subsequent media reports, the term "Eastern Turkestan" was rarely allowed to be used in the official media, and anyone found using the term or referring to Xinjiang as Eastern Turkestan could be arrested, even though this is the term most often used outside China to refer to the region by Uyghurs and other Turkic-speaking people. In the northwestern Uyghur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang, China's State Council and the official media have continued to report on an on-going series of incidents of terrorism and separatism since the large riot in the Xinjiang town of Yining of February 1997, with multiple crackdowns and arrests that have rounded up thousands of terrorist suspects, large weapons caches, and printed documents allegedly outlining future public acts of violence (Brahimi 1999). Amnesty International has claimed that these round-ups have led to hurried public trials and immediate, summary executions of possibly thousands of locals. One estimate suggested that in a country known for its frequent executions, Xinjiang had the highest number, averaging 1.8 per week, most of them Uyghur (Amnesty International 1999: 24). Troop movements to the area, related to the nationwide campaign against crime known as "Strike Hard" launched in 1998 that includes the call to erect a "great wall of steel" against separatists in Xinjiang, were reportedly the largest since the suppression of the large Akto insurrection in April

1990 (the first major uprising that initiated a series of unrelated and sporadic protests) (Hutzler 2001a). Alleged incursions of Taliban fighters through the Wakhan corridor into China where Xinjiang shares a narrow border with Afghanistan have led to the area being swamped with Chinese security forces and large military exercises, beginning at least one month prior to the September 11 attack.

International campaigns for Uyghur rights and possible independence have become increasingly vocal and well organized, especially on the internet. International organizations are increasingly including Uyghur indigenous voices from the expatriate Uyghur community. Notably, as early as 1995 the elected chair of the Unrepresented Nations and People's Organization (UNPO) based in the Hague was a Uyghur, Erkin Alptekin, son of the Uyghur nationalist leader, Isa Yusuf Alptekin, who is buried in Istanbul where there is a park dedicated to his memory.[14] Supporting primarily an audience of mostly expatriate Uyghurs, there are at least 25 international organizations and websites working for the independence of "Eastern Turkestan," and based in Amsterdam, Munich, Istanbul, Melbourne, Washington, D.C., and New York. Following September 11, 2001, the vast majority of these organizations disclaimed any support for violence or terrorism, pressing for a peaceful resolution of on-going conflicts in the region. Nevertheless, the growing influence of "cyber-separatism" is of increasing concern to Chinese authorities seeking to convince the world that the Uyghurs do pose a real domestic and international terrorist threat.

The real question is, what changes in the region have the events of September 11 wrought in terms of local response to Chinese rule? It is clear that the so-called separatist activities are not new and that China is taking advantage of the international war on terrorism to attempt to eradicate a domestic problem. The Istanbul-based groups have existed since the 1950s, the Central Asian Uyghurs under Soviet rule received tremendous support in their anti-China rhetoric regarding policies in Xinjiang, and the Uyghurs have been increasingly vocal since the independence of the Central Asian Republics in 1991 led many to hope for an independent Uyghuristan would have followed on the heels of the other newly independent -stans. Separatist actions have taken place on a small but regular basis since the expansion of market and trade policies in China, and with the opening of six overland gateways to Xinjiang in addition to the trans-Eurasian railway, and China's Western development campaign, there seems to be no chance of closing up shop. The Chinese government itself in a landmark 1999 white paper, admitted serious economic shortfalls in the region despite 50 years of state investment in the development of the region: "The Chinese government is well aware of the fact that … central and western China where most minority people live, lags far behind the eastern coastal areas in development."[15]

In previous years, China denied any serious social or political problems in the region and followed the old Soviet "divide-and-rule" strategy which sought to limit all references to Turkestan or even Turkology that might link the Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Turkic-speaking minorities to broader pan-Turkic movements. Nevertheless, CCP administration continues to pressure nearby countries to repatriate Uyghurs and their sympathizers. In June 2002, under U.S. and Chinese pressure, Pakistan returned one Uyghur activist to China, apprehending among hundreds of Taliban detainees, which follows a pattern of repatriations of suspected Uyghur separatists in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. This detainee was supposedly one of several hundred Uyghurs arrested fighting with the Taliban, with up to six Uyghurs placed in the Guantánamo Bay detention facility (Eckholm and Smith 2001; Pun 2001; *Reuters* 2001), that later expanded to a total of 22 Uyghur detainees (all released to third countries by 2013) (Savage 2013). Clearly, domestic responses to Chinese rule have changed dramatically in the last 30 years for there to be large groups of Uyghur militant Muslims fighting abroad, and

for the Chinese government to publicize separatist actions inside and outside the region, launching large-scale suppressions of potential terrorists. Yet, despite China's increasing crackdowns, fewer reports of civil unrest or terrorist acts have been reported since the late 1990s. The dramatic increase of Uyghur violence in Xinjiang, as well as the rest of China, since the early 2000s, suggests that Chinese policies have done little to stem the tide of Uyghur unrest. It is clear that globalization and the rise of Jihadist Islam through the internet and personal Uyghur activists radicalized abroad, have dramatically changed the scene of Uyghur resistance to Chinese rule, that began with the "cyber-separatism" of the mid-1990s.

Cyber-separatism: giving voice to the Uyghur opposition

Though silenced within China, Uyghur voices can still be heard virtually, on the internet. Perhaps due to Chinese restrictions on public protest and a state-controlled media, or the deleterious effect of a war on domestic terrorism that this chapter has documented began in the late 1990s, very few Uyghur voices can be heard today in the region critical of Chinese policies, at least not public ones. International campaigns for Uyghur rights and possible independence have become increasingly vocal and well organized, especially on the internet. Supporting primarily an audience of approximately over 500,000 to 1 million expatriate Uyghurs (yet few Uyghurs in Central Asia and China have access to these internet sites) there are at least 50 international organizations and websites working for the independence of "Eastern Turkestan," and based in Amsterdam, Munich, Istanbul, Melbourne, Washington, D.C., and New York.[16]

Although the United Nations and the United States government have agreed with China that at least one international organization, ETIM, is a Uyghur-sponsored terrorist organization, the vast majority of the Eastern Turkestan independence and information organizations disclaim violence. Supported largely by Uyghur émigrés who left China prior to the communist takeover in 1949, these organizations maintain a plethora of websites and activities that take a primarily negative view of Chinese policies in the region. Although not all organizations advocate independence or separatism, the vast majority of them do press for radical change in the region, detailing not only human rights violations, but environmental degradation, economic imbalances, and alternative histories of the region. In general, these websites can be divided roughly into those that are mainly information-based and others that are politically active advocacy sites. Nevertheless, whether informational or advocacy, nearly all of them are critical of Chinese policies in Xinjiang.

It is difficult to assess who the audience is for these websites, as they are all blocked in China, and mostly inaccessible in Central Asia due to either inadequate internet access or the high costs of getting on the net. Many Uyghurs I have talked with in China and in Central Asia have never heard of most of these sites. Interestingly, government officials in Xinjiang interested in the information provided on these sites also have said they do not have access. It is clear that Uyghurs in the Western diaspora, particularly in Europe, Turkey, the United States, Canada, and Australia, are frequent readers and contributors to these sites. In addition, events in the region since September 11 have led an increasing number of journalists and interested observers of the region to begin visiting the sites more regularly. In terms of content, it is interesting to note that a cursory monitoring of these sites reveals very little that can be associated with militant or radical Islam, and almost no calls for an Islamic "Jihad" against the Chinese state.[17] Most of the issues as noted above involve documenting the plight and history of the Uyghurs under Chinese rule in Xinjiang as opposed to their glorious, independent past and long history in the region. It is also important to note that few Chinese inside or outside of China have visited these sites so that they are quite unaware of these alternative histories. Although there are

several sites available in Turkish and Uyghur, there is not one in Chinese. As such, like all internet groups, it is a self-selected audience and rarely reaches beyond those who already support and are interested in the agenda supported by the site. Financial support for these organizations and websites comes mostly from private individuals, foundations, and subscriptions (though these are rare). While it has been reported that wealthy Uyghur patrons in Saudi Arabia and Turkey, who became successful running businesses after migrating to these countries in the 1940s, have strongly supported these organizations financially in the past, there is no publicly available information on these sources.

Although most of these websites have limited funding and circulation, they should not be dismissed as forming only a "virtual" community without any substantial impact on events within Xinjiang. Not only have these websites served as an important source of information not available in the official Chinese media, but some scholars have begun to argue that internet sites often help to sway public opinion by virtue of their widespread availability and alternative reporting of important events.[18] While analysts are divided about the potency of the internet for swaying public opinion or influencing domestic events, there is an emerging consensus that it has clearly altered the way information is circulated and opinions are formed. Perhaps more importantly, scholars have concluded that the "virtual communities" formed by internet websites establish links and connections that can lead to broad social interactions and coalitions which have impacted political and socio-economic events. For example, it has been shown that social movements in Syria, Iraq, East Timor, Aceh, Chechnya, and Bosnia have been given strong support through these internet communities, providing not only increased information but large financial transfers as well.[19] The facility with which ISIS and its affiliates have used the internet to mobilize disgruntled young Muslims around the globe illustrates the potency of social media to garner a wide and disparate audience. While "cyber-separatism" would never be able on its own to unseat a local government, it is clear that it does link like-minded individuals and raise consciousness about issues that were often inaccessible to the general public. For an isolated region such as Xinjiang, and the widely dispersed Uyghur diaspora, the internet has dramatically altered the way the world sees the region and the CCP administration must respond to issues within it. To date, the Chinese party-state apparatus has been woefully incapable of utilizing the internet and social media to present an alternate message than radical Islam to disgruntled Uyghur youth.

It is clear that there are more than just internet organizations involved in separatist activities in and around Xinjiang. As noted above, the ETIM was recognized by the United Nations in October 2002 as an international terrorist organization responsible for domestic and international terrorist acts, which China claimed included a bombing of the Chinese consulate in Istanbul, assassinations of Chinese officials in Bishkek, and Uyghur officials in Kashgar thought to collaborate with Chinese officialdom.[20] This designation, however, created a controversy in that China and the U.S. presented little public evidence to positively link the ETIM organization with the specific incidents described (*People's Daily* 2001; Eckholm 2002; Hutzler 2002). In 2001, the U.S. State Department released a report that documented several separatist and terrorist groups operating inside the region and abroad, militating for an independent Xinjiang (McNeal 2001; Fogden 2002). The list included "The United Revolutionary Front of Eastern Turkestan" whose leader Yusupbek (Modan) Mukhlisi claimed to have 30 armed units with "20 million" Uyghurs primed for an uprising; the "Home of East Turkistan Youth," said to be linked to Hamas with a reported 2,000 members; the "Free Turkistan Movement" whose leader Abdul Kasim is said to have led the 1990 Baren uprising discussed above; the "Organization for the Liberation of Uyghuristan" whose leader Ashir Vakhidi is said to be committed to fighting Chinese "occupation" of the "Uyghur homeland"; and the so-called "Wolves of Lop Nor"

who have claimed responsibility for various bombings and uprisings. The State Department report claims that all of these groups have tenuous links with al Qaeda, the Taliban, the Hizb-ut-Tahrir ("Islamic Revival"), and the Tableeghi Jamaat. Many of these groups were listed in the Chinese report that came out in early 2002, but failed to mention ETIM. It came as some surprise, therefore, when at the conclusion of his August 2001 visit to Beijing, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage identified ETIM as the leading Uyghur group to be targeted as an international terrorist group.[21] The main issue for those critical of this designation, with so many identified groups, was why ETIM itself was singled out, unless it was for the political purpose of strengthening U.S.-China relations. The real issue for this chapter, however, is that despite the designation of ETIM, there are active Uyghur-related terrorist groups which can be said to be supportive of terrorism, as well as Uyghurs said to be sympathetic to and indeed fighting alongside of ISIS, but have never been proved to be directly implicated in any specific incident. Nevertheless, the Chinese party-state still tends to focus on ETIM or its avatar, TIP (The Islamic Party of Eastern Turkestan), as the main culprit behind all Uyghur related violent incidents.

Chinese authorities are clearly concerned that increasing international attention to the treatment of its minority and dissident peoples has put pressure on the region, with the U.S. and many Western governments continuing to criticize China for not adhering to its commitments to signed international agreements and human rights. As noted above, China ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Article 1 of the covenant says: "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." Article 2 reads:

> All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.

Although China continues to quibble with the definition of "people," it is clear that the agreements are pressuring China to answer criticisms by Mary Robinson and other human rights advocates about its treatment of minority peoples. Clearly, with Xinjiang representing the last Muslim region under communism, large trade contracts with Middle Eastern Muslim nations, and five Muslim nations on its western borders, Chinese authorities have more to be concerned about than just international support for human rights. Xi Jinping's "One Belt, One Road" program depends on the peaceful resolution of China's "Xinjiang Problem." But on-going violent incidents suggest that an equitable solution is a long way off.

China's Uyghur separatists are small in number, poorly equipped, loosely linked, and vastly out-gunned by the People's Liberation Army and People's Armed Police. And note that though sometimes disgruntled about other rights' and mistreatment issues, China's nine other official Muslim minorities do not in general support Uyghur separatism. Few Hui support an independent Xinjiang, and the one million Kazakhs in Xinjiang would have very little say in an independent "Uyghuristan." Local support for separatist activities, particularly in Xinjiang and other border regions, is ambivalent and ambiguous at best, given the economic disparity between these regions and their foreign neighbors, including Tadjikistan, Kygyzstan, Pakistan, and especially Afghanistan. Memories in the region are strong of mass starvation and widespread destruction during the Sino-Japanese and civil war in the first half of this century, including intra-Muslim and Muslim-Chinese bloody conflicts, not to mention the chaotic horrors of the Cultural Revolution. Many local activists are calling not for complete separatism or real independence,

but generally express concerns over environmental degradation, anti-nuclear testing, religious freedom, over-taxation, and recently imposed limits on childbearing. Many ethnic leaders are simply calling for "real" autonomy according to Chinese law for the five Autonomous Regions that are each led by First Party Secretaries who are all Han Chinese controlled by Beijing. Freedom of religion, protected by China's constitution, does not seem to be a key issue, as mosques are full in the region and pilgrimages to Mecca are often allowed for Uyghur and other Muslims (though recent visitors to the region report an increase in restrictions against mosque attendance by youth, students, and government officials) (Rotar and Homemann 2016). In addition, Islamic extremism does not as yet appear to have widespread appeal, especially among urban, educated Uyghur, yet it is only a matter of time until disgruntled young Uyghur males, like homegrown terrorists in Brussels, Paris, and San Bernardino, Los Angeles are drawn to the radical message of Jihadi Islam. However, the government has consistently rounded up any Uyghur suspected of being "too" religious, especially those identified as Sufis or the so-called Wahabbis (a euphemism in the region for strict Muslim, not an organized Islamic school). The admitted problem of Uyghur terrorism and dissent, even in the diaspora, is thus problematic for a government that wants to encourage integration and development in a region where the majority population are not only ethnically different, but also devoutly Muslim. How does a government integrate a strongly religious minority (be it Muslim, Tibetan, Christian, or Buddhist) into a Marxist-Capitalist system?

Conclusion

To an extent never seen before, the continued incorporation of Xinjiang into China has become inexorable, and perhaps irreversible. The need for the oil and mineral resources of the region since China became an oil importing nation in 1993 means that Chinese influence will only grow.[22] To be sure, the Uyghur are still oriented culturally and historically toward Central Asia in terms of religion, language, and ethnic custom, and interaction has increased in recent years due to the opening of the roads to Pakistan and Almaty. Certainly, pan-Turkism was appealing to some, but not all, Uyghurs during the early part of this century. Historical ties to Central Asia are strong. Yet separatist notions, given the current political incorporation of Xinjiang into China, while perhaps present, are not practicable. As noted above, this is predicated on the assumption that China as a nation holds together. If China should fail at the center, the peripheries will certainly destabilize, with Xinjiang and Tibet having the strongest prospects for separation given the history of dissent and organized separatist activities in the region. It is important to note here that other border regions with large minority populations, such as Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangxi (with 16 million Zhuang), Hainan, and even the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, have not had any reported separatist or terrorist activities. Clearly, by its own admission, the problems in Xinjiang and the oppositional voices of mostly Uyghur groups must be addressed by the state.

The problems facing Xinjiang, however, are much greater than those of Tibet if it were to become independent. Not only is it more integrated into the rest of China, but the Uyghur part of the population is less than half of the total and primarily located in the south, where there is less industry and fewer natural resources. As noted above, however, unless significant investment is found, Tarim oil and energy resources will never be a viable source of independent wealth. Poor past relations between the three main Muslim groups, Uyghur, Kazakh, and Hui, suggest that conflicts among Muslims would be as great as those between Muslims and Han Chinese. Most local residents believe that independence would lead to significant conflicts between these groups, along ethnic, religious, urban-rural, and territorial lines. Given the harsh climate and poor resources in the region, those caught in the middle would have few places to

flee. Xinjiang Han would naturally seek to return to the interior of China, since Russia and Mongolia would be in no position to receive them. Yet given the premise that only a complete collapse of the state could precipitate a viable independence movement and internal civil war in Xinjiang, there would be few places the Han would be able to go. Certainly, the bordering provinces of Gansu and Qinghai would be just as disrupted, and Tibet would not be an option. Uyghur refugees would most likely seek to move south, since the north would be dominated by the Han and the western routes would be closed off by Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. That leaves only the southern routes, and with the exception of Pakistan, no nation in the region would probably be equipped to receive them. Certainly, they would not be better off in present-day Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Given the on-going conflicts in Kashmir, even Pakistan, the most likely recipient of Uyghur refugees, would probably not wish further destabilization of the region. Note also that the main southern route to India and Pakistan, along the Karakhorum highway through the Torghurat pass, is generally passable less than six months out of the year. India, despite its poor relations with China, would certainly not want to add to its Muslim population. During many conversations in Xinjiang with local residents, Muslim and Han alike, it became clear that this fact is well known. Most think that in such a worst-case scenario, there would be nothing to do but stay and fight.

Clearly, China needs a new approach to resolve tensions in Xinjiang; purely Marxist and top-down developmentalist Keynesian economic strategies are not enough. The "Develop the West" campaign has slowed considerably since September 11, 2001 and international tourism has slowed dramatically in the region. Xi Jinping's "One Belt, One Road" strategy may actually be geared to merely leap-frog the region, not unlike the Soviet-inspired trans-Siberian railroad, which did little to bolster Inner Mongolian and even Mongolian economies, in favor of Beijing-Moscow bilateral trade links. The state's economic investment plan has proven not to be a panacea for resolving on-going ethnic problems in the region, that are based on more than just poverty. In a July-August 2002 *Foreign Affairs* article, Chien-Peng Chung, then with the Singaporean Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, called for immediate political changes in the region to avoid further deterioration in ethnic relations (Chung 2002).

China is a sovereign state, and like all modern nations in the era of globalization faces tremendous challenges from migration, economic imbalance, ethnic unrest, and cyber-separatism. Clearly, the Xinjiang model must be as unique to the region as the region is to China itself. Not unlike Hong Kong (which under the "one country, two systems" formula continues to fly its own flag), and many proposals for Taiwan integration, the unique situation in Xinjiang, and possibly Tibet, calls for dramatic and creative solutions to local opposition in the region documented in this chapter. The future of this vastly important region, which Owen Lattimore once called the "pivot of Asia," depends upon it.

In the past 20 years, the opening of China to the outside world has meant much for the Uyghur who, despite many restrictions, have managed to travel beyond China's borders through Pakistan along the Karakhoram highway, through the Ili valley into Kazakhstan, or through Burma to Thailand and Malaysia, or by several CAAC flights to Istanbul from Urumqi. The number of Uyghur pilgrims traveling on the *Hajj* to Mecca has increased by 300 percent. These contacts have allowed the Uyghur to see themselves as participants in the broader Islamic *Umma*, while at the same time being Muslim citizens of the Chinese nation-state. As they return from the *Hajj*, many Uyghurs who generally travel together as a group have told me that they gained a greater sense of affinity with their own as one people than with the other multi-ethnic members of the international Islamic community. State-promoted tourism of foreign Muslims and tourists to Muslim areas in China in hopes of stimulating economic investment is also an important trend related to this opening of Xinjiang and its borders. Urumqi, a largely Han city constructed

in the last 100 years, is undergoing an Islamic facelift with the official endorsement of Central Asian and Islamic architecture which serves to impress many visiting foreign Muslim dignitaries. Most foreigners come to see the colorful minorities and the traditional dances and costumes by which their ethnicity is portrayed in Chinese and foreign travel brochures. The re-creation of Uyghur ethnicity has come full circle: the Chinese party–state has identified a people who have in the last 40 years taken on that assigned identity as their own, and in the process, those who have accepted that identity have sought to define it and exploit it on their own terms. The Uyghur believe they have a 6,000-year cultural and physical history in the region. They are not likely to let it go. Unless new models are explored, patterns of Uyghur resistance may coalesce to increasingly resist Chinese nationalism, both pragmatic and popular, that have only served to inspire a stronger, and increasingly conservative Islamic Uyghur identity. As of today, among the nearly 10 million Uyghurs in China, and the nearly 1 million outside of China, there are an increasing number of voices struggling to be heard regarding the deteriorating situation in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

Notes

1 See discussions of this event which had only sketchy reports by Michael (1995: 26) and Mackerras (2001: 38).
2 *Xinjiang Daily*, April 9, 1997, cited in *People's Republic of China: Gross Violation of Human Rights in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region* (Amnesty International 1999); and *Xinjiang Daily*, July 21, 1997, cited in *Reuters*, Beijing, June 26, 1997.
3 See Ildiko Beller-Hann (2001: 9–23); Nathan Light's dissertation (1998), as well as his very informative webpage on Uyghur and Turkic culture and art, www.utoledo.edu/~nlight/mainpage.htm.
4 See Tyler (1996: 3); *The Economist* (1997a). Note that many Uyghurs in the diaspora believe that the bombs were set by Chinese authorities in order to justify a crackdown on Uyghurs in Xinjiang.
5 *Xinjiang Daily*, July 21, 1997, cited in *Reuters*, Beijing, June 26, 1997; see Becquelin (2000).
6 See her autobiography, Kadeer (2009), and the documentary film by Daniels (2009); see also a YouTube video interview with Ms. Kadeer conducted by Al Jazeera (2010).
7 See Carlson (2014). Tohti's daughter, a student at Indiana University, now living in exile, has published a book (Ilham 2015) about her efforts to win her father's release.
8 Two exceptions include a reported derailment of a Xinjiang train due to a bombing on February 12, 1997, and an attack on a power station in Hejing on July 10, 1999 (unpublished Rand Report).
9 Anwar Yusuf, President of the Eastern Turkistan National Freedom Center, Washington, D.C. Personal interview, April 14, 1999.
10 An excellent photo essay from Southern Xinjiang on *Sixth Tone* has been circulated on the web detailing recent struggles of the Uyghur. See Sun (2017).
11 In the Chinese context, see Ivan Rasmussen's (2015) interesting dissertation on Chinese "rational nationalism."
12 See Geertz (1973: 255–310). Note, the author was inspired by his 1988–89 year with Clifford Geertz at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton to examine Uyghur nationalism from a primordialist perspective. Prof. Geertz once told the author that he wished he had never written the article cited above, since many later associated Geertz with supporting primordialist-inspired nationalism, which he wholeheartedly rejected.
13 PRC State Council White Paper, *Development and Progress in Xinjiang*, September 21, 2009. www. chinaconsulatechicago.org/eng/zt/wp/t585843.htm (accessed February 22, 2017).
14 See writings by Isa Yusuf Alptekin's son, Erkin Alptekin (1978), which also present alternative histories of the Uyghur from that of the Chinese state; see also an article in *South China Morning Post* (Hong Kong) (2002). For Alptekin's involvement with the Unrecognized Nations and People's Organization in The Hague, see its website: www.unpo.org/member/eturk.html.
15 See Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China (1999: 50). See also the Law of the People's Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy (1984), with full text of White Paper on Minority Policies, September 28, 1999, at www.China.org.cn. For poverty in the region specifically among the Uyghur, see Gilley (2001).

16 Estimates differ widely on the number of Uyghurs living outside of China in the diaspora. Uyghurs in Central Asia are not always well represented in the state censuses, particularly since 1991. Shichor (2002) estimates approximately 500,000 living abroad, about 5–6 percent of the total world Uyghur population. Shichor notes that as in many statistical matters, Uyghur websites differ dramatically on the official Uyghur population numbers, from up to 25 million Uyghur inside Xinjiang, to up to 10 million in the diaspora; see, for example, www.Uyghur.org, the site supported by Anwar Yusuf, President of the Eastern Turkistan National Freedom Center in Washington, D.C. Uyghurs in Turkey boast there are over 100,000 Uyghur there, but Turkey does not count any Turkic sub-ethnic group in its state censuses, only *non*-Turkish groups (Armenians, Jews, Arabs, etc.). Thus, an estimate of 1 million Uyghur outside of China is not overly inflated since it is well known that the largest Uyghur populations outside of China are in Central Asia, South Asia, and Turkey, where population statistics are especially unreliable.
17 There is an increasing number of examples of websites calling for jihad among the Uyghur against China, but it is impossible to gauge how influential these sites are and how widely they are viewed by the Uyghur. See Page and Levin (2014).
18 For studies of the influence of the internet in influencing wider public opinion in Asia, see a recent collection of essays in the *Asian Journal of Social Science* edited by Zaheer Baber (2002).
19 See Foster (1997); Jones (1997); Jordan (1999); Rushkoff (1994); Smith and Kollock (1999).
20 The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is known only as a shadowy group known only to be previously active in Afghanistan and founded in the mid-1990s by Hassan Mahsum. Mahsum had served three years in a labor camp in Xinjiang and had recruited other Uyghurs, including his number three leader Rashid who was captured with the Taliban and returned to China in Spring 2001. See Hutzler (2001b).
21 Conclusion of China Visit Press Conference, Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage, Beijing, China, U.S. Department of State, August 26, 2002.
22 One active list-serv and website documenting China's growing exchange with the Middle East is moderated by the Turkish scholar, Tugrul Keskin (Keskin 2017).

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